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INTRODUCTION

There are three subjects excluded from patent eligibility by the
judiciary: laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.'
However, the boundaries of these exceptions are far from clear. 2 For
example, the Supreme Court of the United States' most recent decision
regarding subject-matter eligibility provided sparse guidance for
determining when a patent claim has crossed the line into the abstractidea exception. 3 In response, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has returned to its abrogated Machine-or-Transformation Test
(MorT Test) in order to delineate the contours of the abstract-idea
exception.
The Federal Circuit case AMP v. USPTO seems to present all the
judicial exceptions at once and involves two types of claimed subject
matter-diagnostic methods and DNA molecules. The patentability of
diagnostic methods based on natural correlations raises issues for all
three exceptions.4 The patentability of DNA also implicates a fourth
1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. 556 U.S. --- (2012) (slip op.
at 1); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
2. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 11-24 (The Supreme Court held invalid a diagnostic method claim
that added to a natural law merely uninventive and insignificant steps that were "well known,"
"well-understood, routine, conventional" and previously engaged in. "We need not, and do not,
now decide whether were the steps at issue here less conventional, these features of the claims
would prove sufficient to invalidate them .. . [or] whether, from a policy perspective, increased
protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.").
3. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring)
(The majority's analysis "never provides a satisfying account of what" is an unpatentable
abstract idea).
4. See generally Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski's "Machine-or-
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subject excluded from patent eligibility: raw products of nature.'
AMP v. USPTO is rich in groundbreaking arguments involving
complex issues such as: 1) Are genes patent-eligible subject matter, and
more generally where is the border between what is natural and humanmade? 6 and 2) Which medical diagnostic methods are patent-eligible,
and more generally where is the border between what is an abstract idea
and what is a practical application of an idea?'
As to the first, the Federal Circuit held that all of the DNA claims
were valid. In doing so, the Federal Circuit wisely dispensed of the
district court's reasoning that a natural DNA molecule's informationrich quality and information-based functionality must confer overriding
natural character in all occurrences of the same information in a humanmade molecule. This reasoning implied that the preservation of DNA
sequence information between its natural and artificially manipulated
forms mandates holding that any claimed DNA molecule that has
functionality is based on naturally occurring sequence information and
is an unpatentable raw product of nature.8 Taken more generally, this
Transformation" Test: UncertainPrognosisfor DiagnosticMethods and PersonalizedMedicine
Patents, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 755, 756-58 (2010); Efthimios

Parasidis, A Uniform Frameworkfor Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REv. 323, 335-67 (2010);
Stephen Pessagno, Prometheus and Bilski: Pushing the Bounds of PatentableSubject Matter in
Medical Diagnostic Techniques with the Machine-or-TransformationTest, 36 AM. J.L. & MED.
619, 624-38 (2010).
5. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 306 n.3 (1980) (5-4 decision). The Supreme
Court held that a new bacterium was not the handiwork of nature. Id. at 310. This so-called
"product-of-nature doctrine" goes hand-in-hand with the three judicial exceptions to patenteligible subject matter, id. at 313-15, but the exclusion of raw products of nature does not
accurately fall within any of them. See John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the
Future:Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrierto Biotechnology Patents (Part
I), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 301, (2003); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Border
Wars: Defining the Boundary Between Scientific Discoveries and Patentable Inventions, 25
Trends in Biotechnology 539 (2007), http://www.ipadvocate.org/assistance/acc/pdfs/2.4.lb_
Patent%20 Border0/o20Wars.pdf; Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes andNo, 93 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 19, 32-36 (2011); Brian Zadorozny, The Advent of Gene Patenting:
Puttingthe Great Debate in Perspective, 13 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 89, 104-13 (2009).
6. Eileen M. Kane, PatentingGenes and Genetic Methods: What's at Stake? 6 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 1, 11-18 (2011); Parasidis, supra note 4, at 368-79; Rogers, supra note 5, at 32-45;
Miri Yoon, Comment, Gene Patenting Debate: The Meaning of Myriad, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 953, 960-64 (2010).
7. Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of An Unpatentable Abstract Idea,
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 37, 44-56 (2011); Peter A. Jackman & Michelle K. Holoubek, FineTuning the Test for Patent-Eligibility,43 MD. ST. B.J. 30, 31-33 (2010); Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1338-46 (2011); Paradisis, supra note 4, at 379-89,
623-44; Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility- A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 387, 395-424 (2011).
8. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329, 2011 WL 3211513 (Fed. Cir.
July 22, 2011), cert. granted, ("This conclusion is driven by the overriding importance of
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reasoning suggests that all patent claims directed toward DNA
molecules with naturally occurring sequences are invalid for claiming
ineligible subject matter.9
With regard to the second, AMP v. USPTO added more fuel to the
growing debate over patenting of diagnostic methods, an area brought to
wide attention over five years ago.' 0 Although the Federal Circuit
affirmed the claimed diagnostic methods were invalid for being abstract
under the MorT Test, the case involved policy arguments against the
patenting of medical diagnostic methods. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court mentioned in Bilski v. Kappos that the patentability of modem
diagnostic medicine techniques under the MorT Test is uncertain."
Then in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court suggested that
Congress has yet to show any intention of protectini discoveries of
diagnostic natural laws of nature in the patent statute. However, the
Federal Circuit has continued to rely on its traditional MorT Test in a
series of post-Bilski cases.13
This Note will explore the law regarding the patent eligibility of
processes like the patented diagnostic methods at issue in AMP v.
USPTO. Part I summarizes the legal standards for the patent eligibility
of any process. Part II demonstrates these evolving standards as they are
applied to medically related processes. Part III explains, by reconciling
the case law using hypothetical claims, the current boundaries between
a patent claim to an abstract idea or law of nature and an application of
an abstract idea. Part IV analyzes the eligibility of the diagnostic
method claims in AMP v. USPTO and concludes with a new
formulation of the MorT Test in light of Bilski v. Kappos and an
articulation of a legal standard for invalidating a patent claim directed to
a law of nature in light of Mayo v. Prometheus.
DNA's nucleotide sequence to both its natural biological function as well as the utility
associated with DNA in its isolated form. The preservation of this defining characteristic of
DNA in its native and isolated forms mandates the conclusion that the challenged composition
claims are directed to unpatentable products of nature.").
9. This reasoning would be reasonably limited to all DNA molecules with naturally
occurring sequences that rely on natural sequence information for their inventive purpose.
10. See Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006),
per curiam; Andrew Pollack, Justices Drop Consideration of Boundaries for Patents,
N.Y.TIMES.COM, June 23, 2006 ("Yesterday's outcome ... might mark the end of an expansion
in terms of what you can patent").
11. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
12. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 11-24 (2012).
13. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3541, (June 29, 2010); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1334;
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355-59 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011). After Bilski, the district courts and the BPAI have relied
on the MorT Test as well. Lemley et al., supra note 7, at 1319-21.
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I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF A PROCESS

Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 statutorily declared processes
as patent-eligible subject matter: "Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process . .. or any new and useful improvement thereof,

may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." 4 In drafting this section, Congress codified a practice
existing since the creation of the patent system.15 Although the patent
statute does not define the term "process," the judiciary had been using,
within the ambit of previous patent acts, definitions of process such as
"a series of acts or steps."l 6
Although the patent statute suggests anything, that is, a series of acts
or steps satisfies section 101 with regard to eligibility, a claimed series
of acts or steps can still be rejected or invalidated under section 101.17
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that any
claimed subject matter can be excluded pursuant to the judicially
created exceptions to section 101.18 The judicially created exceptions to
section 101 prevent the patenting of any law of nature, physical
phenomenon or abstract idea.19 Therefore, the Supreme Court has
remarked that the meaning of "process" within in the ambit of section
101 is narrower than a series of acts or steps because a patent claim to a
law of nature, natural phenomenon or abstract idea is never a patentable
process. 20
14. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007).
15. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3245 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
concurring); see also Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 722 (1880) ("That a patent can be
granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines
and new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture.").
16. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728
("A process is an act or a mode of acting.").
17. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1978) ("a series of steps is a
'process' within § 101 unless it falls within a judicially determined category of nonstatutory
subject matter exceptions").
18. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); see
MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., Inc. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Tilghman, 102
U.S. at 726-728; Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852); see generally Ex parte Lundgren,
No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004) (per curiam) (Barrett, A.L.J.,
concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (providing discussion about the distinction between
exclusions and exceptions), overruled, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), af'd but
criticizedsub nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
19. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
20. It is not clear if a process can be considered statutory subject matter under the statute
but ineligible based on an independent, judicially created exception or if the process was never a
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A. The JudiciallyCreatedExceptions to Eligibility
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held the language and intent of
35 U.S.C. § 101 to prohibit the patenting of 1) laws of nature, 2)
physical phenomena, and 3) abstract ideas. 2 1 These exceptions to
subject-matter eligibility have been applied to the various patent statutes
"as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years."2 2 In the
1850s, the Supreme Court held that "the discovery of a principle in
natural philosophy or physical science is not patentable." 23 "[A]
principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one
can claim in either of them an exclusive right." 24 Electricity, or any
other power in nature, is open to all.2 5
In modem times, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold and
elaborate on this reasoning. "Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work." 26 The invention "must come from application of [a] law of
nature to new and useful end." 27

statutory process in the first place. See Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-225 7, 2006 WL 5738364, at *9
(B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006) (per curiam) ("[Tihe position that not every series of steps is a
'process' under § 101 is consistent with the idea that 'abstract ideas' are excluded from § 101.
On the other hand, if every series of steps is a 'process' under section 101, then, in order to
preserve the Supreme Court precedent that abstract thoughts are not patentable, it is necessary to
recognize that certain 'processes' are exceptions to the general rule."), aff'd on other grounds,
130 S. Ct. 3218. The Federal Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court held that the latter was
the law. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("The holding in Benson
forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101. Specifically, the Court has held that a claim is not a
patent-eligible 'process' if it claims 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas."'),
aff'don other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 3218; but see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981)
(5-4 decision) (separating the determination of a "process" from the analysis of the section 101
exceptions). Administrative Patent Judge Lee Barrett clearly believed that the approach in Diehr
was the law. Ex parte Lundgren, 2004 WL 3561262, at *22 (concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("whether a series of steps initially falls within the statutory class of a 'process,' applying
the Supreme Court's definition of transformation of subject matter, should be treated as a
separate issue from whether it is within an exception").
21. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
22. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Supreme Court
precedents from 1853 to 1978).
23. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 115 (1853).
24. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156,175 (1852).
25. Id.
26. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
27. Id.
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1. The Law-of-Nature and Physical-Phenomenon Exceptions
Patents are not available for the handiwork of nature, however useful
that natural product is for society, because policy demands that what
can be obtained in nature must remain freely available for all to use and
improve upon. 28 "[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new
plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter." 29
However, mankind has the ability to "grow in effect another nature,
in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew,
forms such as never were in nature." 30 For over a century, courts have
recognized that materials derived from natural sources are eligible for
patentability if the material is transformed or reduced into a unique form
with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.3 The
Supreme Court has held that a non-naturally occurring manufacture or
composition of matter having a distinctive name, character, and use is
patentable subject matter.3 2
An example of an impermissible claim to a natural phenomenon
occurred regarding Prof. Samuel Morse's invention of the telegraph in
1835.33 When Prof. Morse patented an improved telegraph, he tried to
patent a Rrocess of using electromagnetism to print characters at a
distance. However, one patent claim was drafted broadlyI do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts
of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims;
the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of
the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters,
signs or letters at any distances, being a new application of that
power.3 5
The patentability of this claim went before the Supreme Court of the
United States.3 6 The Court noted someone "who discovers a principle
and devises one mode by which the same can be rendered practically
useful, is entitled to a patent which shall protect him to the full extent of

28. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948).
29. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
30. Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesy (1583), available at http://www.poetry
foundation.org/learning/essay/237818.
31. Rogers, supra note 5, at 31-37; see Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309-13.
32. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309-10.
33. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 68-75 (1853).
34. Id. at 76-78.
35. Id. at 86.
36. Id. at 106.

118

his invention.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W & POLICY

.

[Vol. 17

."37 The Court held that Morse's claim declares that he

does not "intend to surrender to the public the conception he had
reduced to practical utility should anybody else be able to devise other
means for accomplishing the same end, by the use of the same
power."38 "It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim." 39
Morse claimed the exclusive right to every invention using the power of
electric or galvanic current that results in the marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance. The claim was not
limited to any specific process or apparatus.4 0
The Court held this claim invalid because "the claim is too broad,
and not warranted by law." 4 1 The Court made the analogy that no one
would have allowed Fulton to patent his invention of propelling vessels
by steam by claiming the use of "the motive power of steam, however
developed, for the purpose of propelling vessels."4 2
About one hundred years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that someone who "discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful
end."4 3 Similarly, the Court has held that "[w]hile a scientific truth, or
the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
37. Id. at 101.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. at 112-13.
41. Id. at 113; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1880) ("The eighth claim of
Morse's patent was held to be invalid, because it was regarded by the court as being not for a
process, but for a mere principle. It amounted to this, namely, a claim of the exclusive right to
the use of electro-magnetism as a motive power for making intelligible marks at a distance; that
is, a claim to the exclusive use of one of the powers of nature for a particular purpose. It was not
a claim of any particular machinery, nor a claim of any particular process for utilizing the
power; but a claim of the power itself;-a claim put forward on the ground that the patentee was
the first to discover that it could be thus employed. This claim the court held could not be
sustained."). However, the same patent contained other valid claims, such as claim 5 "system of
signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and horizontal lines for numerals, letters, words, or
sentences, substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes." Morse, 56
U.S. at 69. Today, methods of using electricity to print letters at a distance would not be viewed
as a fundamental principle or physical phenomenon; instead this claim likely would be
invalidated under section 112. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd but
criticizedsub nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noted
that Prof. Morse had invented a patent-eligible process that used a machine, but the breadth of
claim 8 exceeded the scope of both the practical application and the scope of the enabling
disclosure when it disavowed any machine or apparatus).
42. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113.
43. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). This statement
seems to blur physical phenomena with laws of nature.

PATENTING MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC METHODS. THE MORTSTRIKES BACK

2012]

119

may be.""
Thus, patents are not available for natural laws or physical
phenomena because that which can be obtained in nature should remain
freely available to everyone. An alternative reasoning for the law-ofnature and physical-phenomenon exceptions is based on the novelty
requirement-the applicant cannot claim to have invented what has
already existed in nature and was merely discovered or recognized by
humanity later.4 5
Some natural laws can be represented as mathematical formulas and
these formulae can be solved by processes termed algorithms.4 6
44.
45.

MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
An example of such a discovery [of a scientific principle] was Newton's
formulation of the law of universal gravitation, relating the force of attraction
between two bodies, F, to their masses, m and m', and the square of the
distance, d, between their centers, according to the equation Frmn'/d2. But
this relationship always existed -- even before Newton announced his
celebrated law. Such "mere" recognition of a theretofore existing phenomenon
or relationship carries with it no rights to exclude others from its enjoyment . . .
. Patentable subject matter must be new (novel); not merely heretofore
unknown. There is a very compelling reason for this rule. The reason is
founded upon the proposition that in granting patent rights, the public must not
be deprived of any rights that it theretofore freely enjoyed.

Id. (citing P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals, § 4, at 13 (1975)); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at
1013 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) ("Natural laws and phenomena can never qualify for patent
protection because they cannot be invented at all. After all, God or Allah or Jahveh or Vishnu or
the Great Spirit provided these laws and phenomena. . . .").
If a natural phenomenon is treated as if it were previously patented . . . by
Mother nature . . . then a claimed innovation based upon that natural

phenomenon is not "new" if it is legally "equivalent" to the natural
phenomenon; it does substantially the same thing by substantially the same
means and in substantially the same way as the natural phenomenon.
Linda J. Demaine & Aaron X. Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN L. REV. 303, 454
(2002).
46. There is a clear difference between a mathematical formula and algorithm. A
mathematical formula can be described as an expression of the relationship between quantities
using the symbols of a given logical language. On the other hand, an algorithm is a method
comprised by instructions or steps for calculating something. Thus, an algorithm can be used to
solve the quantities related by a mathematical formula. HARTLEY ROGERS, JR., THEORY OF
RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS AND EFFECTIVE COMPUTABILITY 1-5 (The MIT Press 1987). This

difference has not been maintained by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's use of such varying language as "algorithm," "formula,"
and "equation" merely illustrates the understandable struggle that the Court was
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"Einstein could not patent his celebrated E=mc2 ; nor could Newton
have patented the law of gravity." 47 These mathematical formulas could
be held patent ineligible under either the law-of-nature or abstract-idea
exceptions. 48
2. The Abstract-Idea Exception
In addition, the Supreme Court has added the abstract-idea
exception, which states that stand-alone algorithms and mere mental
processes are not eligible subject matter for patentability. 49 There is a
"longstanding rule that an idea itself is not patentable."50 Abstract ideas
are not patentable because if a patent claimed an abstract idea,
mathematical formula or stand-alone algorithm, then "in practical effect
the claim would be a patent on the algorithm," idea or formula itself and
pre-empt anyone from using it, even in the abstract.5 1
Abstract ideas are a subject matter that the Supreme Court has
consistently held unpatentable. 52 The abstract-idea exception is most
often raised by patents claiming processes because processes. are most
likely to be described without anything physical. These patents can
having in articulating a rule for mathematical subject matter, given the esoteric
nature of such subject matter and the various definitions that are attributed to
such terms as "algorithm," "formula," and "equation," and not an attempt to
create a broad fourth category of excluded subject matter.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated by, In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
47. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculate Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
48. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 191 (1972) ("we recognize, of course, that when a
claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an
inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract."); Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 ("Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is
like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot be the
subject of a patent.").
49. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. In some sense, all things have an abstract idea behind them.
But the eligibility doctrine is concerned with whether the patent claims seek ownership of a
disembodied idea. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542 n.18 ("[A]bstract ideas constitute disembodied concepts or
truths .... .").
50. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507
(1874)).
51. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 978.
52. Id. at 977.
53. Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2008, 2004 WL 3561262, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20,
2004) (Smith, A.L.J., dissenting).
[P]rocesses represent an especially troublesome type of invention. This is
because almost anything can be claimed as a series of steps that technically can
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run the danger of impermissibly patenting abstract information. A
trilogy of seminal cases demonstrates the application of the abstractidea exception: Parker v. Flook, Gottschalk v. Benson and Diamond v.
Diehr.
a. Gottschalk v. Benson (1978)
In Gottschalk v. Benson, Benson had filed a patent application for a
process that converted binary-coded numerals into pure binary form. 54
Benson's application was rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark

Office (USPTO) under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for embracing nonstatutory
subject matter. Benson appealed the decision, and the case ultimately
reached the Supreme Court. The Court held that Benson's process was
not patentable because it lacked a substantial practical application
outside of a digital computer, and thus, "would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself."5 6
Gottschalk v. Benson illustrates the legal principle that a patent claim
can be rejected or invalidated if it wholly preempts an abstract idea. In
addition, Benson defined process as "a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts,
performed upon the sub ect-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing."

be considered a process, but the term process is so broad that it can be used to
claim inventions that cover nothing more than human conduct or thought
processes that are totally unrelated to any science or technology.
Id.
54. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65-67. Although the preferred embodiment of the invention was
to implement the algorithm on a digital computer, the claims did not explicitly recite any
limitations to a machine. Id.
55. Id. at 71-72.
56. Id. See id. at 68 ("The end use [of Benson's invention] may .. . be performed through
any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.").
57. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 2 (2012) (monopolization of abstract intellectual concepts that
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work might "tend to impede innovation more
than it would tend to promote it"); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012 WL 164439, at *16 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (preemption of an abstract idea forecloses innovation in the area of that idea).
58. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1972));
but see In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (suggesting the statement in
Gottschalk v. Benson is imperfect because the subject matter transformed is not limited to
objects and substances).
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b. Parkerv. Flook (1972)
In Parker v. Flook, Flook filed a patent application for a process of
updating alarm limits for monitoring the operation of catalytic
converters. 59 The process involved an algorithm that used timeweighted averages of operating (parameters to improve upon previous
alarm limit monitoring systems. When a value exceeded an allowable
range, an alarm was sounded. 61 The Supreme Court held that Flook's
patent application was directed to ineligible subject matter where the
patent claim merely limited a mathematical formula to an obvious
category of post-solution applications. 62
Flook warned that an abstract idea cannot be changed into an
application by limiting it to one field of use or by adding token postsolution activity. 63 An ineligible process claim does not become eligible
by the tacking on of uninventive, post-solution activity.64 Later,
"insignificant extra-solution activity" was used to describe all token
post-solution activities as well as mere field-of-use limitations, such as
limiting the process to a technological environment.65 The presence of a
claim limitation that merely constitutes insignificant extra-solution
activity is not sufficient to make an ineligible claim eligible because,
although it prevents whole preemption of a fundamental principle, it
does not limit the scope of the claim to a real world application. 66 As the
Supreme Court noted:
A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution
activity to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean
theorem would not have been patentable, or partially patentable,
because a patent application contained a final step indicating that
the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing
59. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
60. Id. at 585-98.
61. Id. at 594.
62. Id.
63. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), aff'd but criticizedsub nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) ("Therefore,
even if a claim recites a specific machine or a particular transformation of a specific article, the
recited machine or transformation must not constitute mere 'insignificant postsolution
activity."').
64. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
65. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)) ("[T]he
involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be
insignificant extra-solution activity."); see Flook, 437 U.S. at 590"); see id. at 957 n.14
("Although the Court spoke of 'postsolution' activity, we have recognized that the Court's
reasoning is equally applicable to any insignificant extra-solution activity regardless of where
and when it appears in the claimed process. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294 (Fed. Cir.
1994)"); Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981).
66. Id.
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surveying techniques.6 7
c. Diamondv. Diehr(1981)
In Diamond v. Diehr, Diehr attempted to patent a process that used
an abstract formula describing a natural phenomenon. Diehr's patent
application claimed a process that used a computer program running on
a computer controlling a machine that cured synthetic rubber.6 9 The
computer program applied an algorithm that calculated, by using the
Arrhenius equation, parameters based on the natural properties of
rubber. Diehr's application was rejected by the USPTO under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being ineligible statutory subject matter.70
However, the Supreme Court held that the patent was valid because
the algorithm was applied to a better method of curing rubber.7 1
"[W]hen a claim recites a mathematical formula or scientific principle
or phenomenon of nature, an inquiry must be made into whether the
claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract." 7 2
The Court held that the claimed process as a whole was patentable
because it was drawn to a novel industrial process for the molding of
rubber products despite the fact that the algorithm might not, in
isolation, be patentable.
The opinion made clear that it is the entire method that would be
protected and not the mathematical relationship between the
temperature of rubber and its properties as expressed by the Arrhenius
equation.7 3
Diamond v. Diehr illustrates the legal principle that a claim is not
unpatentable just because it recites an algorithm to solve a mathematical
formula, natural relationship, or law of nature. 74 However, if a patent67. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
68. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. The Arrhenius equation "In v = CZ + x" describes the
relationship between chemical reactions and temperature). Id. at 177 n.2.
69. Id. at 178-81.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 192 n.14.
72. Id at 191.
73. Id. at 184-93.
74.
[I]t is inappropriate to determine the patent eligibility of a claim as a whole
based on whether selected limitations constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
After all, even though a fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible,
processes incorporating a fundamental principle may be patent-eligible. Thus, it
is irrelevant that any individual step or limitation of such processes by itself
would be unpatentable under § 101.
Id. at 188; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
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eligible process is properly claimed that contains an abstract idea such
as an algorithm, mathematical formula, law of nature, natural
relationship, scientific principle, or phenomenon of nature, Diehr
explains that the patent claim does not extend to cover the abstract idea
itself.
In addition, the "Diehr doctrine in effect recognizes that inventors
are their own lexicographers. Therefore, inventors may express their
inventions in any manner they see fit, including mathematical symbols
and algorithms. Whether an inventor calls the invention a machine or a
process is not nearly as important as the invention itself."" Thus, the
exceptions to patentable subject matter apply to the subject matter of the
claimed invention regardless of how it is expressed in the patent claim.
"[S]emantogenic considerations preclude a determination based solely
on words appearing in the claims. In the final analysis under § 101, the
claimed invention, as a whole, must be evaluated for what it is. 6 Hence,
the "analysis requires careful interpretation of each claim in the light of
its supporting disclosure." 77
In summary, abstract ideas are never eligible for patentability, but
abstract ideas such as mathematical algorithms and natural laws can be
employed in a patent if the claimed process is limited to a particular
application. "The Court in Diehr thus drew a distinction between those
claims that 'seek to pre-empt the use of a fundamental principle, on the
one hand, and claims that seek only to foreclose others from using a
particular 'application' of that fundamental principle, on the other."
B. How to Apply the Abstract-IdeaException: Bilski
Although processes are patentable, it often is difficult for courts to
determine whether a patent claim is seeking a Benson-style,
impermissible preemption of a fundamental principle or a permissible,
Diehr-style, practical application of an abstract idea.7 9 "The line
75. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rader, C.J., concurring),
abrogated by, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008); id. at 1544 ("[W]hether claimed
subject matter as a whole is disembodied mathematical concept, whether categorized as
mathematical formula, mathematical equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in
essence represents nothing more than a 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract
idea."').
76. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that patentability
does not depend on which form the claim takes).
77. In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1079 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
78. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 187 (1981)).
79. Id. at 954 ("[Tihe more challenging process claims of the twenty-first century are
seldom so clearly limited in scope as the highly specific, plainly corporeal industrial
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between a patentable process and an unpatentable principle is not
always clear. Both are conceptions of the mind seen only by their
effects when being executed or performed."80
The most recent precedent, Bilski v. Kappos, failed to provide much
guidance.81 However, the case shed light on the judiciary's difficulty in
developing workable legal tests for determining which claimed
processes are too abstract. At each level of appeal, Bilski's claims were
held ineligible, but the decisions were based on different reasoning; at
the ultimate level, the Supreme Court Justices could not reach a
consensus on a clear legal standard or test for determining what
constitutes an abstract subject matter.
1. Ex parte Bilski
In 1996, Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw attempted to patent a
process of managing energy consumption risk for commodities sold at
fixed prices. 82 They filed a patent apgication disclosing a process for
hedging risk in commodities trading. However, the first patent claim
was directed to a general process of hedging and was not limited either
to energy prices nor weather-related risks.8 Claim 1 consisted of three
steps:
a. Selling a commodity to consumers at a fixed rate based on
historical averages thereby setting the risk position of the
consumers;
b. Identifying market participants for that commodity having
counter-risk positions to that of the consumers; and
c. Initiating a series of transactions between the commodity
provider and the market participants at a second fixed rate that
manufacturing process of Diehr; nor are they typically as broadly claimed or purely abstract and
mathematical as the algorithm of Benson.")
80. Id. at 980 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978))
(alterations in original) (quoting Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707, 728 (1880)).
81. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011) (In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court "declined
to adopt any categorical rules outside the well-established exceptions for laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas"); Collins, supra note 7, at 39 (noting that Bilski teaches
almost nothing about what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea or how to identify an
unpatentable abstract idea in the future); John R. Thomas, Statutory Subject Matter in Context:
Lessons in Patent Governancefrom Bilski v. Kappos, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 133, 148-49
(2010) (Bilski provides "no guidance") ("Bilski is predicted to produce uncertainty because it
failed to provide meaningful guidance for how to determine which processes are too abstract remains I know it when I see it.").
82. U.S. Patent No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1997).
83. Exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
84. Id.
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balances the risk position of the consumers in the first set of
transactions.
The USPTO rejected all of Bilski's patent claims as being directed to

nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.86 The examiner's

position was that Bilski's claims were not directed to the technological
arts because the process was not implemented on a specific apparatus
and merely manipulated an abstract idea to solve a purely mathematical
problem without any limitation to a practical application.
The examiner stated that Bilski's invention was an abstract idea
under the "technological arts" test, which requires an improvement in
human efficiency by use of technology.88 Under this test, if the claimed
process could be performed by a human operator and was not limited to
being performed by a computer, machine, automated means, or
apparatus tied to known technology, then the claim is rejected for not
89
being directed to statutory subject matter.
Bilski appealed the rejection to the Board of Patents Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI), which affirmed the rejection of the claims as not
patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.90 However in 2006, the BPAI
was struggling with what legal test(s) should be applied to determine
whether a process is abstract.91 The BPAI asked: 1) Are claimed
processes lacking limitations to machines patentable because they are
not "useful"?; 92 2) Is the Federal Circuit's "useful, concrete and tangible
85.
86.

Id.
Id.

87.

Id. at *1-2.

88. Id. at *1.
89. Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20,
2004) ("The examiner finds the separate 'technological arts' test in In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Ex parte Bowman, No.
1999-0583, 2001 WL 1646047 (B.P.A.I. June 12, 2001) (non-precedential).").
90. ExparteBilski,at *1.
91. Id. at *3 ("[M]any questions remain about statutory subject matter and what the tests
are for determining statutory subject matter.").
92. Id. A legal test for "usefulness" suggests, within the ambit of the abstract-idea
exception, a definition of "abstract" is "not practically useful or not applied." Thus,
tautologically any invention that is practically useful" is not "abstract" but instead is an
application. See Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (holding that an
idea is not patentable without some means of making the idea practically useful); In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogatedby In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ("abstract ideas constitute disembodied concepts or truths which are not 'useful' from a
practical standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not 'useful' until reduced to some practical
application."). However, the usefulness or utility of an invention is typically considered
independently from eligibility. In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365 ("Although we have treated
the utility requirement of § 101 as a distinct concept from the question of whether an invention
qualifies as patentable subject matter, a patent claim directed to a law of nature, a physical
phenomenon, or an abstract idea will ordinarily have practical applications that are too
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result" test applicable to claimed inventions lacking recitation of
machines or limitations related to any particular technology?; 93 3) Did
the Supreme Court create a "transformation of a physical subject" test
that reuires matter or energy be transformed into a different state or
thing?; and 4) Did the Supreme Court create an overriding, "abstractidea preemption" test?95
The BPAI warned that the implementation of a process by a machine
is not always sufficient to make the process patent-eligible, and
conversely, the lack of a machine and a transformation is not sufficient
to make the process patent-ineligible. 96 Finally, the BPAI noted a caveat
attenuated from the subject of the claim to be "useful.").
93. ExparteBilski, slip op. at *8.
94. Id. at *6; see Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262, at *21-22
(B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004) (Barrett, A.L.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
[Tihe "subject matter" transformed does not need to be a physical (tangible)
object or article or substance, but can be physical, yet intangible, phenomena
such as electrical signals or electromagnetic waves .

. .

. In my opinion, the

Supreme Court's definition of a statutory "process" as requiring that the steps
operate to physically transform physical subject matter (matter or some form of
energy) to a different state or thing succinctly describes the fundamental
characteristic of "technology" and a process in the "useful arts" ("technological
arts").

Id. This type of legal test implies that a sufficient condition for patent-eligibility is the presence
of a transformation but does not answer the question of whether the presence of a machine alters
or obviates this condition.
95. Ex parte Bilski, slip op. at *8. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellees, Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1403)
2010 WL 4203894, at *5-10 (arguing that the MorT Test must remain secondary to and cannot
supplant the Supreme Court's preemption standard, which is referred to as a "fundamental
guide" or "governing standard").
96. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3326 (2010). For example, a general purpose
machine is not specific enough to impose meaningful limitation on a claimed process. In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1567 (Archer, C.J. & Nies, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
[A] claim formally to a general purpose computer running a certain program
cannot be deemed to satisfy § 101 simply because the computer is a physical,
tangible device. As the invalidated claims in Flook and Benson demonstrate ...
a computer program for use in a physical . . . computer may nevertheless be
held to be nonstatutory subject matter. It is illogical to say that although a claim
to a newly discovered mathematical operation to be performed by a computer is
merely a nonstatutory discovery of mathematics, a claim to any computer
performing that same mathematics is a statutory invention or discovery.
Id.; Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease L.L.C., 2012 WL 603969, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(adding a computer limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept makes the computer
limitation simply insignificant post-solution activity); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012 WL
164439, at *17 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Simply adding a 'computer aided' limitation to a claim
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to most of these tests: physical steps or limitations in a claim are not
necessarily sufficient to convert the claim into statutory subject matter if
they are mere data gathering, field of use limitations or insignificant
post-solution activity.9 7
covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render the claim patent eligible.");
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d. 221, 238-39 (D.D.C. 2011).
To determine whether a machine is particular under the MOT test, courts also
look to whether the machine or apparatus imposes meaningful limits on the
process itself. "In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful
limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the
claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious
mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through
the utilization of a computer for performing calculations." SiRF Tech., Inc. v.
ITC, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed.Cir.2010).
Ex Parte Halligan, No. 2008-2823, 2009 Pat. App. LEXIS 11509, *27-28 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 8,
2009).
The issue presented by this claim is whether recitation of a programmed
computer suffices to tie the process claims to a particular machine. This is the
exact issue that the court in Bilski declined to decide. 545 F.3d at 962. The
court did, however, provide some guidance when it explained that the use of a
specific machine must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart
patent-eligibility. Id. at 961-62 . . . This recitation fails to impose any
meaningful limits on the claim's scope as it adds nothing more than a general
purpose computer that has been programmed in an unspecified manner to
implement the functional steps recited in the claims. Were the recitation of a
"programmed computer" in combination with purely functional recitations of
method steps, where the functions are implemented using an unspecified
algorithm, sufficient to transform otherwise unpatentable method steps into a
patent eligible process, this would exalt form over substance and would allow
pre-emption of the fundamental principle present in the non-machine
implemented method by the addition of the mere recitation of a "programmed
computer." Such a field-of-use limitation is insufficient to render an otherwise
ineligible process claim patent eligible.
Id.; Exparte Bilski, slip op. at *2.
Claims to general purpose machines (usually computers) that merely perform
abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical algorithms), where the fact that the claim is
nominally directed to a "machine" under, § 101 does not preclude it from being
held nonstatutory. We have held that such programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software.
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545.
97. Exparte Bilski, slip op. at *13. These caveats are often referred to as corollaries to the
MorT Test. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd but criticizedsub nom., Bilski
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The BPAI overruled the examiner's reasoning by noting that the
technological arts test was overruled by ExparteLundgren." The BPAI
found that Bilski's patent claims are not directed to statutory subject
matter based on at least six analyses. Without choosing a specific legal
test, the BPAI applied three tests from Lundgren as well as several tests
from the USPTO Interim Guidelines. 99
The BPAI held that the claims: 1) are directed toward a process
within the ambit of the statute; 00 2) do not recite a transformation of
physical subject matter (interpreted to mean matter or energ 1o1 to a
different state or thing;' 0 3) do not produce a tangible result; and 4)
preempt an abstract idea in every possible manner of performing the
claimed process.' 04 Thus, the BPAI concluded that Bilski's patent
claims were properly rejected for claiming only abstract ideas. 0 5
2. In re Bilski
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the BPAI's decision, but with different reasoning. 106 The
Federal Circuit tried to argue that the machine-or-transformation test
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
98. ExparteBilski, slip. at **3-4.
We have reviewed these three cases and do not find that they support
examiner's separate "technological arts" test .... We do not view the court's
statement in Musgrave in regard to the technological arts to have created a
separate "technological arts" test in determining whether a process is statutory
subject matter. Indeed, the court stated as much in Toma.
Id.
99. Ex parte Bilski, slip op. at **14-30; Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applicationsfor Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 1300 Off. Gaz. Patent & Trademark Office
142, 145-46 (Nov. 22, 2005).
100. ExparteBilski, slip op. at **14-30.
101. Id. at *6 ("The subject matter transformed may be tangible (matter) or intangible
(some form of energy, such as the conversion of electrical signals or the conversion of heat into
other forms of energy (thermodynamics), but it must be physical").
102. Id.at*18-22.
103. Id. at *21-23; State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogatedby, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943.
104. ExparteBilski,slip op. at *23; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
105. Ex parte Bilski, slip op. at *18-30; see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010)
(interpreting Ex parte Bilski to hold that Bilski's claims involved only mental steps that did not
transform physical matter, and thus, are directed to an abstract idea). But cf id. at 3233 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (interpreting the decision to have alternative conclusions-Bilski's claims: 1)
involve only mental steps that do not transform physical subject matter and 2) are directed to an
abstract idea.).
106. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 966 (holding that Bilski's claims do not satisfy the sole and
exclusive MorT Test).
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(MorT Test) should be the exclusive analysis of the boundaries of the
abstract-idea exception.10 7 The Federal Circuit's MorT Test was a bright
line test derived from the loose framework laid out by the trilogy of
Supreme Court cases Diehr, Flook and Benson. 08 Benson states that
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability
of a process claim that does not
09
include particular machines."'
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a ... process which . . . is performing a

function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing),
then the claim satisfies requirements of § 101.0
The Federal Circuit articulated the MorT Test as "a claim reciting an
algorithm or abstract idea can state statutory subject matter only if, as
employed in the process, it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or
otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a
107. The Federal Circuit repeatedly referred to the MorT Test as the Supreme Court's
creation. See, e.g., id. at 966 ("machine-or-transformation test set forth by the Supreme Court
and clarified herein"). However, the exclusive MorT Test was clearly a creation of the Federal
Circuit. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 ("Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different
state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines.") (emphasis added).
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a "different state or
thing." We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.
Id. (emphasis added).
[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that
formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (emphasis added).
108. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952. First, Benson stands for the proposition that under 35
U.S.C. § 101 a process patent claim cannot wholly preempt a fundamental principle, like the
Arrhenius equation in Diehr. Benson, 409 U.S. at 63. Second, Diehr demonstrates that a process
that transforms matter to a different thing using a fundamental principle can be patent eligible.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175. Finally, Flook provides the caveat that token post-solution activity
cannot change an ineligible claim into an eligible claim. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
109. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
110. Diehr,450 U.S. at 192.

2012]

PATENTING MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC METHODS: THE MORT STRIKES BACK

131

machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."'1 The corollary of
that, in order to impart patent-eligibility is the involvement of another
class of statutory subject matter which must impose meaningful limits
on the claim's scope and which must not be insignificant extra-solution
activity or mere field of use limitations.'12
Some commentators say the MorT Test serves as a proxy for
assessing the Benson proposition, namely whether a process claim
impermissibly preempts the use of an abstract idea or fundamental
principle." 3 In order to satisfy the MorT Test, a claimed process must
have significant limitations on its scope imparted by either: 1) the
involvement of a specific machine, apparatus or other statutory subject
matter"l 4 or 2) a transformation of physical matter or energy." In
11l. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 978 (2009). A less accurate articulation of the MorT
Test is a claimed method is statutory subject matter only if it [1] is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or [2] it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. Id. ("[T]he
Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in which such a method may qualify as a
section 101 process: when the process 'either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus or [2]
operated to change materials to a different state or thing."'); contra In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954
("A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.") (emphasis
added).
112. In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d at 961-62; but see id. at 957 (The court distinguished "mere
field-of-use limitations" from "insignificant post-solution activities" by arguing that "mere fieldof-use limitations" are generally insufficient to render a claim patent-eligible (citing Diehr,450
U.S. at 191-92)).
113. See Michael J. Shuster & Juleen Konkel, OfBabies andBathwater - The Impact of In
Re Bilski on Life Science Patents, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 153, 159-60 (2009); Murphy &
Murphy, supra note 4, at 756; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
The Supreme Court, however, has enunciated a definitive test to determine
whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a
particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the
principle itself. A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it
is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.
Id.
114. Under the MorT Test, what satisfies the machine prong is not clear. First, the machine
prong seems broad enough to include any non-process statutory subject matter: machines,
articles of manufacture and compositions of matter. The Court defined machine as "a concrete
thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices." Burr v. Duryee, 68
U.S. 531, 570 (1863), and "every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and
devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." Coming v. Burden, 56
U.S. 252, 267 (1853). The Court defined manufacture as "the production of articles for use from
raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or
combinations, whether by handlablor [sic] or by machinery. . . ." Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Brogdex, Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) (citing THE NEw CENTURY DICTIONARY, vol. 2 (1931)).

"Compositions of matter" have been defined to include "all compositions of two or more
substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they be [the] results of chemical union, or of
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addition, the limitation must be meaningful to satisfy the corollary
derived from Flook-the involvement of another class of statutory
subject matter or transformation must be central to the claim 's
purpose.
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids." Shell Dev. Co. v.
Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957), affd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Thus, the
machine prong most certainly includes any concrete article such as a device or apparatus. E.g.,
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1063-64 (E.D.
Mo. 2011).
For the purposes of determining whether a claimed process is tied to a
particular machine, a "machine" is "a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of
certain devices and combination of devices. This includes every mechanical
device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some
function and produce a certain effect or result." SiRF Technology, Inc. v.
International Trade Com'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
Id. However, a general purpose machine is not specific enough to impose meaningful limitation
on a claimed process. Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *26 (B.P.A.I. Mar.
8, 2006). An unanswered question is under what circumstances is a computer recited in a
claimed process a general purpose machine or a specific machine. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 994,
aff'd on other grounds, (Newman, J., dissenting) ("We aren't told when, or if, software
instructions implemented on a general purpose computer are deemed 'tied' to a 'particular
machine..."').
115. Within the ambit of the MorT Test, the meaning of the term "transformation" is not
clear. Generally, the transformation of physical matter or energy seems to satisfy the
transformation prong. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 ("It is virtually self-evident that a process for
a chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible subject
matter."); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (The claimed process involved "physical process steps that transform one physical,
electrical signal into another" that represent a real-world heart beat were held to be patent
eligible.). But see In re Nuitjten 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (The court held that intangible and
transitory propagating electrical signals were ineligible subject matter). However, Judge Linn's
dissent argued that transient electric or electromagnetic transmissions are statutory manufactures
and that there is no tangibility requirement for manufactures noting traditions in the chemical
arts. Id. at 1359 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. The MorT Test can be viewed only as an approximate
proxy for assessing the Benson proposition because some claims that are limited by the presence
of a machine or transformation might still wholly preempt an abstract idea. For example, even if
Benson's claim to a binary conversion algorithm was limited to being performed on a specific
computer, it might still not be patent eligible because the effect of the claim would wholly
preempt an abstract idea in all substantial, practical applications. That is unless the MorT Test
can discriminate whole preemption by its corollaries. It is not clear if a claim limitation to a
computer could be excluded either as a general purpose computer or as a limit to a mere fieldof-use. See Ex parte Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364, at *13; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
Furthermore, the claim could arguably contain a transformation of data about real-world objects.
Thus, even if a claim satisfies either prong of the MorT, it might still fail the "governing"
preemption test from Benson. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 979 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
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3. Bilski v. Kappos

The eligibility of Bilski's claimed process went before the Supreme
Court in Bilski v. Kappos.17 Although Bilski's patent was directed to a
process in the financial industry, this case became a more general
debate about the patentability of processes often referred to as business
methods. 18 However, "business methods" is a misnomer. Although it
refers to investment strategies, ecommerce protocols and tax strategies,
it also may refer to any process of organizing human activity not
involving manufactures, machines or the creation of compositions of
matter, such as physical sports moves, dance moves, meditation, dating,
arbitration some medical diagnostics and data processing by computer
software.l 9
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, the
U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
117. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
118. "Business method" can be defined as any processes of organizing human activity not
involving the use of machines, manufacturing, or transformations of compositions of matter. See
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 974. But see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228 (plurality opinion) (There is no
clear definition of "business method").
119. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1004 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (Judge Mayer
expressed the absurdity he saw in some patents. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (method of
training janitors to dust and vacuum using video displays); U.S. Patent No. 6,119,099 (method
of enticing customers to order additional food at a fast food restaurant); U.S. Patent No.
6,329,919 (system for toilet reservations); U.S. Patent No. 7,255,277 (method of using colorcoded bracelets to designate dating status in order to limit the embarrassment of rejection);
Transcript of Bilski, Oral Argument at 5-7, 9-10, 12 16, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010) (No. 08-064) (Justice Ginsburg mentioned methods for avoiding corporate takeovers or
picking a jury; Justice Sotomayor asked if a method of speed-dating was patentable; Justice
Breyer asked about a method for teaching antitrust law that would keep 80% of the students
awake; Chief Justice Roberts wondered about a patenting of a method to maximize wealth-"buy
low and sell high;" Justice Kennedy questioned patent rights for someone who went to the
Bureau of Statistics and worked out a table of life expectancy; and Justice Scalia noted the
apparent absurdity of a patent for training horses); William A. Drennan, The PatentedLoophole:
How Should Congress Respond to this JudicialInvention?, 59 FLA. L. REv. 229, 230-41 (2007);
F. Scott Kieff et al., It's Your Turn, But It's My Move: Intellectual Property Protectionfor
Sports "Moves," 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 765, 769-70 (2009); see
generally Giles S. Rich, PrinciplesofPatentability,28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1960).
Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national defense, the
invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the
techniques of teaching a course in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a
patentable invention because it is outside of the enumerated categories of
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof." Also outside that group is one of the greatest
inventions of our times, the diaper service.
Id
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Court's reasoning overturned most of the Federal Circuit's reasoning.120
First, Bilski abnegated the Federal Circuit's MorT Test by downgrading
it to "a useful and important clue, an investigative tool."'21 In other
words, the Court held that a process does not need to be embodied in,
operate on, transform, or otherwise involve another class of statutory
subject matter to be patent-eligible.122 However, this downgrade might
have a minor impact because Bilski suggests that eligibility extends to,
or likely extends to, everything that satisfies the MorT Test.' 23 Thus,
passing muster under the MorT Test is sufficient in most cases, even
though it is not necessary, because it is unlikely that any invention
would satisfy the MorT Test and not satisfy Bilski. 4
What is more likely is an invention that fails to pass muster under
the MorT Test could still be eligible for patentability. 125 Justice
Kennedy warns that the nature of future technologies in the Information
Age are unknown, and the courts should avoid freezing the inquiry to
old technologies to avoid leaving no room for the revelations of new
technologies. 26 "The Information Age empowers people with new
120. By holding Bilski's claims ineligible subject matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit, who had affirmed the BPAI, who had affirmed the examiner-but at each level
the higher court's reasoning disrupted most of the reasoning at the previous levels. Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. at 3224-25, 3229-30.
121. 130 S. Ct. at 3226-27 (The Supreme Court merely repeated language from Benson,
409 U.S. at 70, and Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9, and noted that the MorT Test "was not intended
to be an exhaustive or exclusive test.").
122. Id. at 3221. This holding partially vindicated Judge Newman's dissent in In re Bilski,
which correctly read Benson and Flook to say that subject matter is patent-eligible even if it is
not tied to a particular machine or apparatus nor transforms articles or materials to a different
state or thing. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(noting that the vigor of the Information Age has been contributed to by various inventions that
apply contemporary electronic and photonic technologies and use processes that handle data and
information in ways that do not transform physical matter or are not performed by machines).
123. Supplemental Brief for the Appellant, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (2010) (No. 2008 1403), 2010 WL 4203895, at *2-3, *6 ("[E]ven if [the
Federal Circuit] determines in Bilski's wake that satisfaction of the machine-or-transformation
test does not necessarily establish patent-eligibility, it unquestionably creates a strong
presumption of patent-eligibility . ... That presumption might be rebuttable in a rare case"). The
Federal Circuit essentially agreed, saying that "as applied to the present claims, the useful and
important clue, an investigative tool [the MorT Test], leads to a clear and compelling conclusion
[]that the present claims pass muster under § 101." Prometheus,628 F.3d at 1355.
124. See SmartGene, Inc. v. Adv. Biological Labs, SA, --- F. Supp. 2d --- 2012 WL
1059611, *18 (D.D.C. 2012) ("A claimed method may still constitute eligible subject matter
despite failing to satisfy the MOT test."). In a rare case like Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972), the MorT Test is overinclusive, but this is accounted for by the overriding preemption
test. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellees, Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No.2008-1403) 2010 WL 4203894, at *8-11.
125. This means the MorT Test is not only over-inclusive, Benson, 409 U.S. 63, but also
under-inclusive according to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bilski. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
126. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227-28 (plurality opinion).
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capacities to perform statistical analyses and mathematical calculations
with a speed and sophistication" that enable more efficient methods of
performing business tasks. 12 7
With regard to Bilski's claims, the Court held that they were directed
to unpatentable abstract ideas just like the mathematical algorithms in
Benson or Flook.128 The Court held that Bilski's claims would
impermissibly preempt the use of this hedging method in all fields,
thereby effectively granting a monopoly over an abstract idea.1 29
An example of a narrower claim from Bilski's application is claim 6,
which is limited to the weather-related price risk position of the
consumers based on a mathematical formula:
a. selling energy to consumers at
Price

=

Fi + [(Ci + Ti + LDi)(a + PEWi)], where

Fi = fixed costs in period i,
Ci = variable costs in period i,
Ti= variable long-distance transportation costs in period i,
LDi= variable local delivery costs in period i,
a, P, E are constants estimated by statistical modeling of
consumption, and
Wi = an estimated location-specific weather indicator in
period i.
b. identifying transmission distributors of energy having
counter-risk positions to that of those consumers; and
c. initiating a series of transactions between the commodity
provider and the transmission distributors at a second fixed
rate that balances the risk position of the consumers in the
first set of transactions wherein the energy provider seeks a
swap receipt to cover the marginal weather-driven cost.130
The two concurring opinions in Bilski would have held all business
127. Id. at 3229.
128. Id. at 3222. The Supreme Court defined a mathematical algorithm as '[a] procedure
for solving a given type of mathematical problem . . . .' Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 n.1
(1978) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. 65). Is there an algorithm in Bilski's invention? A quick
glance at claim 6 leaves little doubt.
129. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
130. Joint Appendix, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL
2373016, at *20.
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methods as not processes within the ambit of section 101 and thus
categorically unpatentable.131 Justice Stevens's concurrence found that
Bilski's claims do not claim an abstract principle as in Flook nor a
phenomenon of nature embodied in a mathematical formula as in
Benson.132 Justice Stevens questioned: 1) the majority's suggestion that
Bilski's claims suffered from a lack of specificity and 2) the majority's
parsing out of the limitations to particular fields, particular input data,
and to particular ways of analyzing the data as insignificant postsolution activity.
4. The Impact of Bilski v. Kappos
Unfortunately, Bilski does not explain why Bilski's claims were
more like Benson's and less like Diehr's. Instead it offers an "I know it
when I see it" test.134 Justice Stevens's concurrence points out the lack
of guidance provided by the majority, stating the majority's analysis
"never provides a satisfying account of what" is an unpatentable
abstract idea meaning these "musings on the issue stand for very
little."l 35
Commentators have struggled to articulate the Bilski legal test for
process patent eligibility.13 6 Some explain Bilski as delineating a loose
legal standard lacking precise contours but providing several

131. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3257.
132. Id. at 3235.
133. Id. at 3235-36.
134. Collins, supra note 7, at 39; Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme
Court's Business Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 14-16 (2011) (opining that the Supreme Court Justices all
intuitively rejected Bilski's claims. "[T]he section 101 abstract idea preemption inquiry can lead
to subjectively-derived, arbitrary and unpredictable results .

. .

. The reasoning is sparse and

palpably unpersuasive . . . Rather, the Court merely refers to its own opaque precedent.").
Collins, supra note 7, at 37, 39-40 (Bilski "teaches the patent community almost nothing about
what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea or how to identify an unpatentable abstract idea in
the future . . ." The Supreme Court gave a "sparse and incomplete exposition of what constitutes
and unpatentable abstract idea. . . ." Further, the Court blatantly asserted that "an unpatentable
idea is whatever they think it is." Thus, the Court was "strategically incomplete in their analysis.
. ."); Jad Mills, Patentable Subject Matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 377, 385 (2011) ("[T]he Court's decision failed to articulate a clear and
predictable boundary line for patentable subject matter under Section 101 . . .
135. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3236.
136. E.g., Collins, supra note 7, at 65 ("Bilski offers only the roughest sketches
concerning what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea and leaves much for further
refinement."); Paul E. Schaafsma, The Casefor FinancialProductPatents: What the Supreme
Court Got Right and Wrong in Bilski v. Kappos, and a Suggestion for a Reasonable Line on
Business Method Patents, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 398, 412 (2010) ("There isn't

one.").
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landmarks. 137
First, Bilski maintains that subject-matter eligibility is a threshold
test.13 8 Second, if the claim is capable of being reduced to a
mathematical formula or algorithm, regardless of how it was expressed
by the applicant, then the subject matter can be held ineligible for being
too abstract.139 Third, Bilski maintains the Flook corollary that
"insignificant postsolution activity" and "mere field-of-use limitations"
do not overcome the abstract-idea exception to eligible subject
matter.140 Fourth, the abstract-idea exception to eligible subject matter is
137. Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, "Clues "for Determining Whether Business and
Service Innovations are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 109, 112-15
(2011).
138. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
139. Id. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981)) ("Diehr
emphasized the need to consider the invention as a whole, rather than 'dissect[ing] the claims
into old and new elements in the analysis."'); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1978) (In
analyzing subject matter eligibility, "each invention must be evaluated as claimed; yet
semantogenic considerations preclude a determination based solely on words appearing in the
claims. In the final analysis under s 101, the claimed invention, as a whole, must be evaluated
for what it is."); In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1079 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("This analysis requires
careful interpretation of each claim in the light of its supporting disclosure . . .").
140. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 (2008). It is important to note that although the
Supreme Court used the term post-solution activity, the reasoning of Flook has been applied by
the Federal Circuit "to any extra-solution activity regardless of where it applies in the
process[,]" including a mid-process step of entering bids in a record or the pre-solution step of
gathering data. Id. at 957 n.14 (citing In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and 1n re
Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Bancorp, -- F. Supp. 2d at *8. Bilski was silent as to
whether the extra-solution activity corollaries encompass inherent data-gathering steps, but In re
Bilski made clear that data-gathering steps can be excluded from the eligibility analysis for
being extra-solution activity. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. This court and our predecessor court
have frequently stated that adding a data-gathering step to an algorithm is insufficient to convert
that algorithm into a patent-eligible process. E.g., Grams, 888 F.2d at 840 (step of "deriv[ing]
data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory"); Meyer, 688 F.2d at 794 ("[datagathering] step[s] cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory"). Id.; see In re Sarkar,
588 F.2d at 1335.
[T]he method of solving a mathematical equation may not be the subject of
patent protection . . . [and] the addition of the necessary antecedent steps of
establishing values for the variables in the equation cannot convert the
unpatentable method to patentable subject matter.. .. [(citing In re Christensen,
478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (1973)] No mathematical equation can be used, as a
practical matter, without establishing and substituting values for the variables
expressed therein. Substitution of values dictated by the formula has thus been
viewed as a form of mathematical step. If the steps of gathering and
substituting values were alone sufficient, every mathematical equation,
formula, or algorithm having any practical use would be per se subject to
patenting as a "process" under § 101.
Id.

138

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA W& POLICY

[Vol. 17

not limited to high-level abstractions.141 Thus, not only is claiming a
risk hedging process in general too abstract, but claiming a very specific
hedging process limited to a specific commodity also can be abstract.
Fifth, a claimed process is not necessarily eligible just because of the
involvement of a transformation or other statutory category such as a
machine. 142
Faced with this uninstructive precedent, the USPTO issued new
guidelines to its examining corps that made failing the MorT Test create
a presumption of subject-matter ineligibility for abstractness. 143 First,
apply the machine-or--transformation test. If the claimed process does
not meet the machine-or-transformation test, then reject claims
embodying an abstract idea. This shifts the burden to the applicant to
explain why claimed method does not embody an abstract idea.144

141. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. By affirming the rejection of Bilski's claims, the Supreme
Court did more than hold the mere concept of hedging patent ineligible because the more
narrow claims were limited to transactions between real-world parties regarding real-world
commodities. Id.
142. This is a logical conclusion following from the Supreme Court's holding that the
MorT Test is too rigid and thus cannot be the exclusive or exhaustive test. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct.
at 3228 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (the MorT Test is not the exclusive test because
"Section 101's terms suggest that new technologies may call for new inquiries."); Id. at 3259
(Breyer & Scalia, JJ., concurring) ("[T]he Court intends neither to de-emphasize the [MorT
Test's] usefulness nor to suggest that many patentable processes lie beyond its reach.").
143. Interim Guidelines for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View .of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,925 (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter Interim
Guidance 2010]; see GrafflRoss Holdings LLP v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 07-796,
2010 WL 6274263, at *5-6 (D.C.C. 2010).
[T]he Interim Guidance states that when a process claim meets the MOT test,
the claim is less likely to be drawn to an abstract idea . . . . The presence or

absence of a single factor will not be determinative. 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,926. All
the relevant factors should be weighed to determine whether the claim as a
whole would essentially grant a monopoly over an abstract idea or whether the
claimed process is limited to a practical application of the concept. Id.
Id.
144.

Interim Guidance 2010, supra note 143, at 43,925.
Factors that weigh in favor of patent-eligibility satisfy the criteria of the
machine-or-transformation test or provide evidence that the abstract idea has
been practically applied. Factors that weigh against patent-eligibility neither
satisfy the criteria of the machine-or-transformation test nor provide evidence
that the abstract idea has been practically applied.

Id.
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C. Other Legal Tests for Abstract Subject Matter
By overturning the Federal Circuit's attempt to limit the abstractidea exception analysis to the MorT Test, Bilski opened up the analysis
to multiple legal tests and served as an open invitation to the Federal
Circuit to develop new legal tests, limits, and criteria.14 5 Thus, past legal
tests overturned by In re Bilski could be resurrected and modified so
they could coexist alongside the MorT Test.146 Examples of some
discarded legal tests and other countries' legal tests for abstract subject
matter include:
1. Abele/Meyer/Walter Test: First, the claim is analyzed to
determine whether it directly or indirectly recites a mathematical
algorithm. Next, if a mathematical algorithm is found, the claim as a
whole is further analyzed to determine whether it, in its entirety, wholly
preempts the algorithm. The whole preemption occurs only if the
algorithm 1) does not operate on a claimed physical step; 2) is not
implemented in any manner to physical elements; or 3) is not applied in
a specific manner to refine or limit claim steps in an otherwise statutory
process; provided that its application is circumscribed by more than a
field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution activity.14 7
145. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222-23 (In disapproving of the exclusivity of the MorT Test, the
Supreme Court "by no means desires to preclude the Federal Circuit's development of other
limiting criteria that further the Patent Act's purposes and are not inconsistent with its text");
Supplemental Brief for Appellant, Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628
F.3d, 2010 WL 4203895, at *5 ("[T]he Supreme Court thought the machine-or-transformation
test was too restrictive and left open the possibility that this Court would develop other less
restrictive 'limiting conditions' for patentability under § 101.").
146. However, the Supreme Court suggested that the UCT Test is disfavored when stating
"nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past. See, e.g., St. Street Bank, 149 F.3d, at
1373; AT & T Corp., 172 F.3d, at 1357." Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. But see Graf/Ross, 2010 WL
6274263, at *4 (reading this to be a complete overrule of all the Federal Circuit's previous
patent-eligibility tests, "[t]he Court also repudiated the Federal Circuit's MOT test as an
exclusive test and rejected all other previous Federal Circuit § 101 tests entirely, including the
State Street test. 130 S. Ct. at 3231.").
147. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). The Abele/Meyer/Walter Test was overruled by In re Bilski. Bilski, 545
F.3d 943,959 n.17 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
[W]e conclude that the Freeman-Walter-A bele test is inadequate. Indeed, we
have already recognized that a claim failing that test may nonetheless be patenteligible. See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838-39 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Rather, the
machine-or-transformation test is the applicable test for patent-eligible subject
matter. Therefore, in Abele, Meyer, Grams, Arrhythmia Research Technology,
Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and other decisions,
those portions relying solely on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test should no
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2. Useful, Concrete and Tangible Result Test: Is the claimed process
capable of producing a useful, concrete and tangible result? 48 The
Useful, Concrete and Tangible Test (UCT Test) was applied by the
involved
processes that
machine-implemented
judiciary to
transformation of data.' 49
longer be relied on.
Id. at 959, 959 n.17. Although Kappos v. Bilski may allow for the resurrection of legal tests
overruled by In re Bilski, the Abele/Meyer/Walter Test likely will remain deceased because the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly suggested it is flawed. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1374 ("After
Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to
determining the presence of statutory subject matter.").
148. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1541-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding patent-eligible a
rasterizer that mathematically transforms data to eliminate aliasing in a digital oscilloscope);
State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373-75 (holding patent-eligible a data processing system for
managing financial services configurations of portfolios); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communc'ns,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (holding
patent-eligible a system for creating a billing signal from a telephone call recipient's primary
interexchange carrier by using Boolean algebra and switching and recording mechanisms).
149. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04CV1200JAH(RBB),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *34 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) ("[W]hile the Federal Circuit
has applied the standard, it has always done so in the context of computer-related inventions
involving algorithms for data manipulation."), rev'd, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Although
Kappos v. Bilski may allow for the resurrection of legal tests overruled by In re Bilski, the UCT
Test likely will remain deceased because the Supreme Court has already suggested it is flawed.
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232 n.1 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring) ("Even
if the machine-or-transformation test may not define the scope of a patentable process, it would
be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a 'useful, concrete and tangible result,' State St.
Bank, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (C. A. Fed.1998), may be patented."); Id. at 3259 (Breyer & Scalia,
J.J., concurring).
[T]his by no means indicates that anything which produces a "useful, concrete,
and tangible result," State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (C.A. Fed. 1998), is patentable. "[T]his Court
has never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement would
cover instances where this Court has held the contrary." [(citing Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006))]. . ..
Indeed, the introduction of the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" approach
to patentability, associated with the Federal Circuit's State Street decision,
preceded the granting of patents that "ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to
the truly absurd." In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (C.A. Fed. 2008) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
Id.; see also In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (The "'useful, concrete
and tangible result test' 'is insufficient to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under §
101,' Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959, and 'is adequate,' id. at 960"). The UCT Test "inappropriately
focuses on the result of the claimed invention rather than the invention itself .... "Id. at 1365.
However, Judge Newman believed, at least in 2008, that the UCT Test had proven to be of
ready and comprehensible applicability in a large variety of processes of the information age.
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3. Technological Arts Test: If the claimed process could be
performed mentally by a human and was not claimed in a way limiting
to being performed by a machine, apparatus, automated means or tied to
known science or technology, that is, technological arts then the claim
must be rejected as not defining statutory subject matter. o
4. Australian Test for Patent-Eligible Process: The process must
have a mode or manner of achieving an end result which is an
artificially created state of affairs of utility in the field of economic
endeavor. 151
5. Canadian Test for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: The invention:
(i) must not be a disembodied idea but have a method of practical
application; (ii) must be a new and inventive method of applyin
and knowledge; and (iii) must have a commercially useful result. m skill
D. What Does it Mean to be Abstract?
The term "abstract" can have multiple meanings. Abstract can mean
existing only in the mind as a result of cognitive processes and not
existing in the physical world. Abstract can also mean general and
vague instead of definite and specific. Furthermore, abstract can mean
hypothetical as opposed to having actually occurred.
In a patent-eligibility sense, abstractness is stated as the difference
between an idea and an application of an idea. 153 This usage does not
match any of the definitions just stated because an "application of an
idea" can exist only in the mind, be described only in general and can be
completely hypothetical-for example, Alexander Graham Bell's
patent-eligible, telephone patent claim 5.154 On the other hand, an
Contra In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 991 (Newman, J., dissenting).
150. Exparte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262, at *2, *5 (B.P.A.I., Apr. 20,
2004). In re Bilski rejected the Technological Arts Test, suggesting that being technological was
already accounted for by the statutory classes of subject matter. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1002-03
(Mayer, J., dissenting).
151. Grant v. Comm'r of Patents [2006] FCR 120 at [30], [32] (Austl.) (This test requires
a "concrete, tangible, physical or observable effect," or "phenomenon or manifestation or
transformation," that creates a physical consequence.).
152. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), (2010) F.C. 1011, [34], [74-77] (Can. Ont.
Fed. Ct.) (("the language used in the American and Canadian Acts to describe patentable
subject-matter is almost identical") (holding Amazon.com's "one-click" ordering system patenteligible)).
153. Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
154. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535, 537, 8 S. Ct. 778, 782-83 (1888) ("It is
quite true that when Bell applied for his patent he had never transmitted telegraphically spoken
words so that they could be distinctly heard and understood at the receiving end of his line. . . ."
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"abstract idea" can exist and be described with definite and specific
language and be actual, for example, Benson's patent-ineligible, binary
conversion software.
So how does patent law distinguish an idea from an application of an
idea? In a patent-eligibility sense, abstractness appears to depend on
several dimensions: 1) tangible versus intangible, 2) specifics versus
generalities, 3) the result of the claimed process and 4) the practical
effect of the patent claim.
Abstractness might depend on the difference between the physical
world and the intangible world.1 55 Abstract things cannot be touched
and cannot touch things. Abstract things are metaphysical, such as ideas
and mental processes. The MorT and Abele/Meyer/Walter tests seem to
focus on this distinction. These tests recognize an abstract idea via its
lack of any connection to the physical world.1 56 The Australian test
requires tangibility as well. 57
Abstractness might depend on the difference between generalities
and specifics or between vague language and detailed language. Even
real-world things can be described in the abstract; thus, the difference
could come down to the level of detail used.158 The Supreme Court
Claim 5 of U.S. Patent 174,465 was for "'the method of transmitting vocal or other sounds
telegraphically, as herein described, by causing electrical undulations similar in form to the
vibrations of the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, substantially as set
forth..."').
155. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853).
156. However, any legal test based on identifying tangibility has been criticized for
providing a misleading conclusion where a process is directed toward a natural correlation. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, Stevens &
Souter, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) ("[V]irtually any natural phenomenon for
virtually any useful purpose could well involve the use of empirical information obtained
through an unpatented means that might have involved transforming matter."). This criticism
may be accounted for by the "mere data-gathering" corollary to the MorT Test. But see Ex parte
Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262, at *2, *5 (B.A.L.I. Apr. 20, 2004) (Barrett,
J.L.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
It is difficult to determine whether a process is merely a "law of nature,"
"physical phenomena," or "abstract idea," because the claims are usually
drafted to recite minor physical limitations such as data-gathering steps, field of
use limitations, and post-solution activity. The question is whether the claim
"as a whole" is directed to the kind of subject matter that was intended to be
protected.
Id.
157. Grant v. Comm'r of Patents [2006] FCR 120 at [30], [32] (Austl.); Ben McEniery,
Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v. Commissioner of Patents, 13
COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REv. 70, 70-74,

100-106 (2007) (arguing this tangibility

requirement is flawed).
158. Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, "Clues" for Determining Whether Business and
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suggested that the court must determine whether the claim is describing
a section 101 exception in abstract process terms.159 However, this
distinction is more akin to disclosure requirements' 60 because an
invention need not be made to be patented. Thus, a hypothetical
invention can be properly claimed so long as the scope of the claim is
supported by the disclosure.
The UCT Test is focused on the end product or result of the claimed
process. This test seems to define abstract as unable to produce a
tangible result. The UCT Test recognizes abstract by searching for an
application of the idea that has a result central to the purpose of the
invention in the physical world. This test might differentiate between
some of Bilski's claims, for example by rejecting claim 1 (which results
in a general series of hedged transactions between buyers and sellers
based on risk), but allowing claim 6 (which results in a specific series of
hedged transactions between transmission distributors and commodity
providers based on marginal, weather-driven costs).
The Benson preemption principle is focused on the effect of the
Service Innovations are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 109, 116
(2011) ("To promote such progress, inventions need to be concrete, not abstract; they must also
be specific, not general. Progress must be capable of being measured; it must have direct
benefits that can be defined. Abstract ideas, on the other hand, lack specific benefits that are
measurable."); see Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. But see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235-36
(Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring) ("It is true, as the Court observes,
that petitioners' application is phrased broadly ... if a series of steps constituted an unpatentable
idea merely because it was described without sufficient specificity, the Court could be calling
into question some of our own prior decisions.").
159. Diehr,450 U.S. at 191-92.
160. See Morse, 56 U.S. at 112-22 (The Supreme Court seemed to confuse eligibility with
enablement); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235-36 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J.J.,
concurring).
It is true, as the Court observes, that petitioners' application is phrased
broadly.. . . But claim specification is covered by §112, not §101; and if a
series of steps constituted an unpatentable idea merely because it was described
without sufficient specificity, the Court could be calling into question some of
our own prior decisions.

Id.; Research Corp. Techs. V. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d at 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
[T]his [Federal Circuit] notes that an invention which is not so manifestly
abstract as to override the statutory language of section 101 may nonetheless
lack sufficient concrete disclosure to warrant a patent . . . subject matter
might also be so conceptual that the written description does not enable a
person of ordinary skill in the art to replicate the process.
Id. But see Chisum, supra note 134, at 19-21 (suggesting that the disclosure analysis alone could
serve the purpose of screening out abstract claims).
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claim, but gives little insight into a definition of abstract. The Benson
preemption principle simply identifies abstract claims by their effect
and shows that whole preemption of an abstract idea is impermissible.
This principle warns that even an application of an idea that interacts
with the physical world via a machine or transformation can still be
impermissible.16 1
In practice, the outcome of these tests often turns on which process
steps, recitations and claim limitations the court thinks are excluded
from the analysis by corollaries. Steps, recitations and claim limitations
that link the process to the physical world, such as that operates on or
transform another class of statutory subject matter, are eliminated from
the legal analysis if not central to the claim's purpose.162 These steps,
recitations or limitations are categorized as insignificant post-solution
activity, such as mere field-of-use limitations or merely requisite datagathering steps, and are excluded because they fail to impose any
meaningful limitation on the claimed process. In Bilski, the majority
161. However, the "section 101 abstract idea preemption inquiry can lead to subjectivelyderived, arbitrary and unpredictable results." Id. at 14. The articulation of the Benson inquiry as
the difference between the preemption of an abstract idea and the application of an abstract idea
is confusing. An abstract idea can be "applied" to human behavior to get a real-world result,
e.g., the patent-ineligible claims of Bilski or Comiskey. However, the courts seem to intuitively
drawn a line between what is technological and what is not. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 97980 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

We concluded that the claims were instead drawn to the "mental process" of
arbitrating disputes, and that claims to such an "application of [only] human
intelligence to the solution of practical problems" is no more than a claim to a
fundamental principle. Id. at 1377-79 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67
("[M]ental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as
they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.")).... [T]he fact
that the claims in Comiskey required a decision to actually be rendered in the
arbitration [does not change the lack of a requirement to] use [of] any particular
machine or achieve any eligible transformation.
Id.
162. The requirement of determining whether a step or limitation is central to the purpose
of the claimed process was criticized by Judge Newman for conflicting with precedent. The
Supreme Court has "stated that 'there is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential' element,
'gist' or 'heart' of the invention." Bilski, 545 F.3d at 994 (Newman, J. dissenting) (quoting
Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The invention
"must be considered as a whole, rather than dissected in assessing its patent eligibility under
Section 101, see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188." Id. This type of analysis is difficult to predict and is
flexible enough to change from adjudicator to adjudicator, examiner to examiner, judge to judge
or justice to justice. "Each patent examination center, each trial court, each panel" of the Federal
Circuit, "will have a blank slate on which to uphold or invalidate claims based on whether there
are sufficient 'meaningful limits' or whether a transformation is adequately 'central' or the
'significance' of the process steps." Id.
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excluded much of Bilski's claim limitations, to the consternation of
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion.1 63
In summary, a process can be patented if it is statutory subject matter
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and otherwise satisfies all the conditions
and requirements of title 35. Statutory subject matter does not include
the judicial exceptions, which have been determined by various
threshold tests. Patents claiming processes often run the risk of being
directed merely to abstract ideas. To pass the abstract-idea exception, a
process cannot wholly preempt an abstract idea.164 The legal tests to
determine this are evolving, but the implementation or tying of a
process with another statutory subject mater or a transformation is a
useful clue.' 6 5
II. PATENTING PROCESSES RELATED TO MEDICINE

Bilski v. Kappos might have called into question all decisions made
based on the MorT Test or during the In re Bilski era, roughly October
2008 to June 2010. Mostly, the correctness of any invalidity decisions
based on a finding of ineligible subject matter under the MorT Test are
unclear.166 Furthermore, the future viability of the UCT,
Abele/Meyer/Walter and Technological Arts tests are uncertain despite
being overruled by the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.167 A review of a
few cases decided by the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), demonstrates these tests
in action when the subject matter involves processes related to
medicine.
163. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, J.J., concurring)
("In other words, the Court artificially limits petitioners' claims to hedging, and then concludes
that hedging is an abstract idea rather than a term that describes a category of processes
including petitioners' claims. Why the Court does this is never made clear.").
164. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
165. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227.
166. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has made clear that a patent claim's failure to satisfy the machine-ortransformation test is not dispositive of the § 101 inquiry."). See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236.
167. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1348 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
Although Bilski reiterated that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is "inadequate"
for determining patent-eligibility, Bilski spoke approvingly of the analysis
regarding the patent-eligible method in Abele. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63.
Thus, the determination that claim 6 of Abele's patent was patent-eligible
subject matter is still good law post-Bilski.
Id.
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A. In re Abele
Abele filed a patent application directed to an improvement in image
processing of computerized axial tomography (CAT) scans.168 The
image processing aimed to eliminate or reduce artifacts by the use of a
computerized algorithm.' 6 9 Two of Abele's patent claims were:
Claim 5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the
steps of calculating the difference between the local value of the
data at a data point in the field and the average value of the data
in a region of the field which surrounds said point for each point
in said field and displaying the value of said difference as a
signed gray scale at a point in a picture which corresponds to said
data point.
Claim 6. The method of claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray
attenuation data produced in a two-dimensional field by a
computed tomography scanner.17 0
The examiner rejected the claims for being directed to nonstatutory
subject matter where, apart from the mathematical calculations, the
remaining steps were not novel or were merely necessary antecedent
data-gatherin steps.' 7 1 The BPAI affirmed the rejection using the
Walter Test. 2 However, the CCPA partially reversed the BPAI,
holding that claim 6 was patentable.1 7 3
The CCPA suggested that any claim that calculates a difference was
directed to an algorithm.174 Claim 5 was held invalid for being directed
toward ineligible subject matter, but claim 6 was held to be eligible
subject matter.17 ' The court held that in claim 5, the algorithm is
"neither explicitly nor implicitly applied to any certain process," and is
"directed merely to a mathematical formula." By contrast, claim 6
requires the performance of a CAT-scan before using the algorithm. 7 6
Claim 5 represents no more than the calculation of the product of an
algorithm and display of the result.' 7 7 This claim did not specify any
168.
943 (Fed.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 904 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogatedby In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
Cir. 2008).
Id. at 904.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 904-05.
Id. at 908-09.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 908-09.
Id.
Id.
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particular type or nature of data, did not identify how or from where the
data were obtained, and did not indicate what the data represented. 7 8
On the other hand, claim 6 served to improve an otherwise statutory
process that involved passing an X-ray beam through an object using a
CAT scanner and detecting the X-rays upon exiting the object.179 The
process in claim 6 contains X-ray production and detection steps
required as data gathering but not dictated by the algorithm. Therefore,
the "production and detection cannot be considered mere antecedent
steps to obtain values for solving the algorithm."Is The presence of the
production and detection steps is statutory; and thus, the presence of an
algorithm is irrelevant.' 8 '
B. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc.
Metabolite Laboratories (Metabolite) was a licensee of a patent
claiming processes for diagnosing and treating specific . vitamin
deficiencies.1 82 The patented process at issue involved three basic steps:
1. Measuring levels of homocysteine and methylmalonic acid in
body fluids or tissues.

178. Id.
179. Id.; see In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
180. In re Abele, 684 F. 2d at 908-09 (comparing In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A.
1977), with In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d at 1336 n.18 where the claimed steps "did not reach the
effect of data gathering steps which are not dictated by the algorithm").
181. Id. The Federal Circuit revisited Abele and applied the MorT Test in Bilski v. Kappos.
Bilski v. Kappos, 554 F.3d 943, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
This data clearly represented physical and tangible objects, namely the
structure of bones, organs, and other body tissues. Thus, the transformation of
that raw data into a particular visual depiction of a physical object on a display
was sufficient to render that more narrowly-claimed process patent-eligible. We
further note for clarity that the electronic transformation of the data itself into a
visual depiction in Abele was sufficient; the claim was not required to involve
any transformation of the underlying physical object that the data represented.
We believe this is faithful to the concern the Supreme Court articulated as the
basis for the machine-or-transformation test, namely the prevention of preemption of fundamental principles. So long as the claimed process is limited to
a practical application of a fundamental principle to transform specific data,
and the claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents specific physical
objects or substances, there is no danger that the scope of the claim would
wholly pre-empt all uses of the principle.
Id.
182.

Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006).
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2. Diagnosing a Vitamin B9 (folate) or Vitamin Bl2
(cobalamine) deficiency based on the observation that elevated
levels of homocysteine and methylmalonic acid correlates with
Vitamin B12 deficiencies; however, elevated levels of
homocysteine with normal levels of methylmalonic acid
correlates with Vitamin B9 deficiencies.
3. Treating the subject by administering Vitamin B9 or Vitamin
B12 to raise the concentration levels in the body of the subject
toward the optimal range.' 8 3
Later it was discovered that these vitamin deficiencies also correlate
with, heart disease.' 84 Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings
(LabCorp) had been licensing Metabolite's patent when they developed
a new test to diagnosis heart disease based on measuring the
concentrations of homocysteine.18 5 This led Metabolite to sue LabCorp
for patent infringement. 6 The district court held the patent not invalid
and infringed.' 8 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding the
district court made no err identified by the appellant. 8 8
It was not until petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari that
LabCorp introduced the argument that patent claim was invalid for
being directed to ineligible subject matter.189 LabCorp argued that
allowing this t e of process patent permits the patenting of basic
scientific facts.' The claim at issue was claim 13:
A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in
warm-blooded animals compromising the steps of:
a. assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine, and
b. correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate. 91

183. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986).
184. Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 128.
185. Id. at 128-29.
186. Id. at 129.
187. Id. at 130.
188. Id. at 131-32. Before the district court and the Federal Circuit, LabCorp argued patent
claim invalidity only for failure to meet section 112 requirements. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
189. Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 132.
190. Id. at 133.
191. U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20, 1986).
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The case had almost made it to the Supreme Court when a writ of
certiorari was granted. By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari for being improvidently granted.192 The practical
outcome of the dismissal was the enforcement of the Federal Circuit's
decision. However, Justices Breyer, Stevens and Souter dissented from
the Court's dismissal. 19 3
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued that this patent should be
held invalid because the claim is solely composed of a natural
phenomenon. 194 There can be little doubt that the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a natural
phenomenon. Thus, the dissent concluded that the patent wholly
preempts a natural principle violating the law-of-nature exception.195
The dissent further bolstered its opinion with policy considerations,
arguing the public interest was not served by the negative impact of this
type of patent would have on healthcare providers.
In particular, the
dissent emphasized that patents claiming medical diagnostics could
inhibit physicians from using their best medical judgment for fear of
patent infringement and contribute to rising healthcare costs by
diverting resources from the medical task of health care to the legal task
of searching patents and obtaining license agreements. In summary, the
dissent argued that this was not patentable subject matter based on the
underlying policies of patent law and the practical impact of medical
diagnostic patents in raising the cost of healthcare while inhibiting its
effective delivery. 97
192. Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 125-26. Although not provided, the Court's reasoning may
have relied upon the absence of any section 101 issue raised in the lower court and the fact that
the Federal Circuit did not have the opportunity to apply their input and expertise on the issue.
193. Id. at 125.
194. Id. at 137-38.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 138.
197. Id. at 127 (Breyer, Stevens & Souter, J.J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by
providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example
by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading
them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending
patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs
of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.
Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks
to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten.
One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and risky
shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery
within the scope of patentability while excluding others.
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Later, Chief Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit criticized the dissent
in Metabolite for failing to recognize the difference between an
unpatentable correlation and a correlation that is patentable because it is
limited to a useful, tangible and concrete result used to diagnose a

disease. 9 8

C. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC
Classen patented processes of estimating the risk of developing
chronic immune-mediated disorders based on particular vaccination
schedules.1 99 The patent claims were broad, for example as they were
not limited to any specific vaccine or vaccine-administration schedule.
The first set of claims includes the steps of immunizing mammals with
dose(s) of immunogens according to a schedule and comparing the
results with that of a control group. The second set of claims comprises
the steps of determining a low-risk schedule (perhaps by the previous
patent claim) and then immunizing mammals using it:
Set 1. A method of determining whether an immunization
schedule affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immunemediated disorder in a treatment group of mammals relative to a
control group. 200
Set 2. A method of immunizing a mammalian subject that
requires:
Id.
198.

In re Bilski v. Kappos, 545 F.3d 943, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
The fundamental error in that Lab. Corp. dissent is its failure to recognize the
difference between a patent ineligible relationship - i.e., that between high
homocysteine levels and folate and cobalamin deficiencies-and a patent eligible
process for applying that relationship to achieve a useful, tangible, and concrete
result - i.e., diagnosis of potentially fatal conditions in patients. Nothing
abstract here. Moreover, testing blood for a dangerous condition is not a natural
phenomenon, but a human invention.

Id. However in hindsight, Justice Breyer's dissent might be vindicated because Metabolite's
claimed processes appear to consist merely of data-gathering steps prior to a mental step.
Furthermore, in light of Bilski v. Kappos, satisfying the UTC Test is neither necessary nor
sufficient. But see Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 933, 981 (the claim must be viewed as a whole-"the claim does not describe the natural
relationship between homocysteine and vitamins per se, but a way of applying the natural
relationship to diagnose the condition of a patient. It is overlooking a great deal to say simply
that claim 13 amounts to a simple natural correlation.").
199. U.S. Patents No. 5,723,283; 6,420,139 & 6,638,739.
200. U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283.
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a. comparing the incidence of immune-mediated disorders in
treatment groups with different vaccination schedules; and
b. immunizing patients on schedules identified as low-risk.20 1
The accused infringers argued that the Classen's patent claims were
unpatentable because they involve "thinking about" whether a
vaccination schedule reduces the incidence of chronic disease, and,
therefore, seek to patent an abstract mental process about a natural
phenomenon.202 Classen argued that the patents at issue do not claim a
scientific truth, but instead describe a method for reducing the incidence
of chronic, immune-mediated disorders." 203
The district court held the patent claims invalid for encompassing an
unpatentable natural phenomenon, the correlation between an
immunization schedule and the risk of developing an immune
disorder. 204 The district court held that the first set of claims was
directed to "a general inquiry of whether the proposed correlation
between an immunization schedule and the incidence of chronic
disorders exists" and the second set of claims was directed toward "the
idea that there is a relationship between vaccine schedules and chronic
immune mediated disorders." The district court held that the second set
of claims amounted to an "indirect attempt to patent the idea that there
is a relationship between vaccine schedules and chronic immune
mediated disorders."20 5
. The step of immunizing patients in accordance with a schedule
determined to be low risk might be transformative as the immunization
schedule can alter the patient's immune system and ameliorate the
symptoms of the chronic disorder. Thus, the district court held that this
*
* *206
step was insignificant post-solution activity.
This case was appealed during the In re Bilski regime, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed that the claims were invalid as being directed
to unpatentable subject matter under the MorT Test. 20 After Bilski the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision and remanded
the case back to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light that
201.
202.

U.S. Patent No. 6,420,139 & 6,638,739.
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 381 F. Supp. 2d 452, *5 (N.D. M.D.

2006), af'd in partrev. in part,--- F.3d --- , 2011 WL 3835409 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011).

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. Appx. 866,867 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (unpublished), cert. grantedand vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543, (June 29, 2010), aff'd in part
rev. in part,--- F.3d --- , 3835409 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2011).
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the intervening Bilski decision might reasonably affect its decision. 20 8
On remand, the Federal Circuit reversed-in-part by holding that the
patent claims represented by Set 2 are patent-eligible.2 09 Although the
Court affirmed that the claims represented by Set I do not pass "the
coarse filter of § 101," the Court reversed its previous decision by
holdin the claims represented by Set 2 satisfy the threshold of section
101.
While not relying solely on the MorT Test in its reasoning, the
Federal Circuit held the Set 2 claims pass the transformation prong.211
The Court found the Set 2 claims converted an abstract scientific
principle into a specific application because the claimed processes
require a final immunization step in accordance with a low-risk
schedule.
On the other hand, the Court held that the Set I claims merely
require reviewing the scientific literature without requiring a postmental step of applying the knowledge.2 12 The Set I claims are
"directed to the simple step of reviewing the effects of known
immunization schedules." 213 These patent claims are "infringed by the
act of reviewing the published information, whether or not any change
in the immunization schedule is made upon such review."214
In dissent, Judge Moore would have held both sets of claims invalid
for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.2 15
The immunization step . . . is nothing more than post-solution
activity.. . . The post-solution immunization does not transform

the unpatentable principle - that a correlation exists between
vaccination schedules and incidence of chronic immune disease into a patentable process. Tying an abstract idea to a tangible
result or a specific field of endeavor does not make the idea any
less abstract. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230. To hold otherwise would
allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations
on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection.
Diamond,450 U.S. at 192.216
Chief Judge Rader and Judge Newman added additional views,
arguing for a more permissive section 101 analysis to promote
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
Classen, --- F. 3d at **8-10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *18 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at *23 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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innovation and warning against judicial limitations on patent-eligible
subject matter.2 17
[C]areful claim drafting or new claim forms can often avoid
eligibility restrictions. Eligibility then becomes a game where
lawyers learn ingenious ways to recast technology in terms that
satisfy eligibility concerns .

. .

. When careful claim drafting or

new claim formats avoid eligibility restrictions, the doctrine
becomes very hollow. 2 18
D. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
Prometheus Laboratories (Prometheus) is the sole and exclusive
licensee of patented processes of managing the dosage of a specific
class of pharmaceuticals during the course of therapy. 9 The patented
process involve calculating improved dosages of thiopurines during the
course of treatment of gastrointestinal disorders by adjusting the dosage
administered based on feedback data quantifying the concentrations of
thiopurine metabolites in the patient's tissue samples.2 20
The claimed processes at issue consisted of three basic steps:
1. Administering thiopurine drugs to a patient.
2. Measuring the levels of thiopurine metabolites in the blood of
the patient.
3. Correlating the metabolite level with an adjustment in drug
dosage to avoid toxic side effects. (The adjustment aims to keep
thioPurine levels between 230 picomolar and 400 picomolar per 8
x10 red blood cells to maximize efficacy and minimize
toxicity.)22 1
The Mayo Collaborative Services (Mayo) created their own method
of dosage management of thiopurines.22 When Prometheus sued for
patent infringement, Mayo responded that the patents were invalid for
claiming ineligible subject matter-the natural correlations between the
concentrations of drug metabolites in the body and the dosage of the
217. Id. at **15-17 (Rader & Newman, JJ., additional views).
218. Id. at *16 (Rader & Newman, JJ., additional views).
219. Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
220. U.S. Patent Nos. 6,355,623 (filed Mar. 12, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed
Mar. 12, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed June 27, 2002).
221. U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (Claim 1).
222. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1340.
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drug. 223 Just as LabCorp had done in Metabolite, Mayo argued that the
patent claims preempted a fundamental relationship of nature, that is, a

natural phenomenon. 224
The district court agreed with Mayo's arguments and held
Prometheus's patents invalid under section 101 for claiming a natural
phenomenon.225 First, the district court eliminated the necessary datagathering steps for any use of the correlations, which left only the final
step. The court held that the final step was merely a mental step and
thus the claims are directed only to abstract ideas. 22 Second, the district
court found that the claims amounted to a claim of a natural
phenomenon-"the correlations between certain thiopurine drug
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy and toxicity."
Third, the
district court held that "[b]ecause the claims cover the correlations
themselves, it follows that the claims 'wholly pre-empt' the
correlations. The scope of the claim would preempt all use of the
naturally occurring correlation."2 2 8
On appeal, Prometheus argued that the claimed processes pass
muster under both prongs of the MorT Test. 229 The processes
inextricably rely on numerous machines, such as high-pressure liquid
chromatography apparatus, to process bodily samples and to determine
the metabolite concentrations. Furthermore, the entire process depends
on human-made drugs that are transformed in the body, but the district
court excluded any administering step as merely insignificant extrasolution activity.
However, under the In re Bilski regime, the Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that the claims satisfied the MorT Test.2 3 1 The disagreement
between the courts was over whether certain steps should be eliminated
from the analysis as being extra-solution steps.232 In opposition to the
district court, the Federal Circuit held the administering and measuring
steps were included in the subject-matter eligibility analysis.2 3 3
First, the Federal Circuit held the thiopurine administration and
metabolite measuring steps were central to the claimed process and not
223. Id. at 1340-41.
224. Brief of the Appellees, Mayo Collaborative Servs. for the Federal Circuit,
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serys., 2008 WL 5972188, at *12 (Mar. 30,
2008).
225. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1341.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1343.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1350.
232. Id. at 1347.
233. Id. at 1347-48.
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extra-solution activities, such as data gathering. 234 This is "central to the
purpose of the claims, because the determining step is, like the
administerin step, a significant part of the claimed method of
treatment."
While it is true that the administering and determining steps
gather useful data, it is also clear that the presence of those two
steps in the claimed processes is not "merely" for the purpose of
gathering data. Instead, the administering and determinin steps
are part of a treatment protocol and they are transformative. 36
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the invention was
therapeutic, that is, to better treat particular diseases by assessing the
drug dosage during the course of treatment.2 37
Second, the Federal Circuit found that the claimed processes met the
transformation prong because the steps of administering thiopurine and
measuring metabolites both involved transformations. 238 The
administration of artificial thiopurine drugs causes a transformation
inside the human body.239 Furthermore, the measurement of thiopurine
metabolites involves extraction of tissue samples and the physical
modification of these extracts, such as by high-pressure liquid

chromatography. 240
In addition to the two transformative steps, the Federal Circuit found
234. Id. Any data-gathering step that is merely dictated for input to solve an algorithm
could be considered extra-solution activity. Id. at 1343 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
"Further, the inherent step of gathering data can also fairly be characterized as insignificant
extra-solution activity." Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd but
criticizedsub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 1230 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)).
235. Id. at 1345.
236. Id. at 1346-47. The majority distinguishes Prometheus's patent claims from the
claims at issue in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), where clinical laboratory testing
was held to be the extra solution activity of mere data gathering. See id. at 1348. In Grams, the
applicant claimed a process that involved (1) performing a clinical test on individuals and (2)
based on the data from that test, determining if an abnormality existed and determining possible
causes of any abnormality by using an algorithm. We found that this process was not drawn to
patentable subject matter because the Grams was unpatentable because "it was merely an
algorithm combined with a data-gathering step," i.e., performing a clinical test .... Here, unlike
the clinical test recited in Grams, the administering and determining steps in Prometheus's
claimed methods are not "merely" data-gathering steps or "insignificant extra-solution activity";
they are part of treatment regimes for various diseases using thiopurine drugs. Id.; but see In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (noting that "at least in most cases, gathering data would not constitute a
transformation of any article."). Prometheus seems to be the exception that proves the rule.
237. Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1349.
238. Id. at 1345-47.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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that the entire process was transformative because it was a medical
treatment. 241 The "claims are in effect claims to methods of treatment,
which are always transformative when a defined group of drugs is
administered to the body to ameliorate the effects of an undesired
condition." 242 The fact that the transformation relies on natural
processes does not disqualify any step; all transformations follow
natural laws. 243 "Every transformation of physical matter can be
described as occurring according to natural processes and natural
law." 244
Prometheus argued that the patent claims met both prongs of the
MorT Test.2 45 The Federal Circuit stopped its analysis after finding the
transformation prong was satisfied. 24 The court concluded that if the
claimed processes pass muster under the MorT Test, then those
processes do not wholly preempt a fundamental principle. 4 7 Similarly,
the Federal Circuit concluded that, by satisfying the MorT Test, the
claims were directed to applications of a natural law and therefore,
claimed patent eligible subject matter.2 48
The final step was considered ineligible on its own for being an
abstract mental step, but the presence of the earlier transformative steps
make the entire process patent-eligible subject matter-as the presence of
an abstract step does not defeat patentability. 249
After Bilski, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Id. at 1346.
Id.; exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006).
Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1346; In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1356.
Prometheus, 581 F.3d at 1343-44.
Prometheus points to three "transformations" within its claimed process: (1) the
first step of administering a synthetic drug transforms the biochemical makeup
of the patient's body for the purpose of treating disease; (2) the second step
requires the transformation of a bodily sample to determine the created
metabolites' concentration levels; and (3) the metabolite levels are transformed
into a warning for a doctor to alter the dosage. . . . Prometheus contends that
everything proceeds according to natural laws .... Prometheus then argues that
these machines and transformations are central to the invention's purpose of
improving a process of treatment and are not confined to extra-solution activity.
Prometheus asserts that the district court erred by parsing the steps of the
treatment method rather than looking at the method as a whole, which applies
the correlations in concrete physical processes-that Prometheus argues are
patentable absent the correlation-to generate useful information.

Id. at 1343-44.
246. Id. at 1346.
247. Id. at 1348-49.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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case back to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit reaffirmed their
previous decision by holding that Prometheus claims satisfied the
transformation prong of the MorT Test and "the preemption test." 250
The Federal Circuit stressed the MorT Test worked the first time
around, saying the "'useful and important clue,5 an investigative tool,'
leads to a clear and compelling conclusion."2 The Federal Circuit
reaffirmed its finding that the claimed processes were particular
applications of natural correlations that included transformative steps. 252
The claimed processes solved the problem of treating a specific disease
using a therapeutic method that involves administering specific drugs
and measuring specific metabolites. 253 The processes included the
250.
251.

Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1358-59 (2010).
Id. at 1355.
Bilski did not raise, and should not be read to overrule, the long-established
view that processes (like Prometheus's) that do meet the machine-ortransformation test do satisfy § 101. Second, even if this Court determines in
Bilski's wake that satisfaction of the machine-or-transformation test does not
necessarily establish patent-eligibility, it unquestionably creates a strong
presumption of patent-eligibility, which will be rebutted only in rare cases
involving patents on starkly abstract ideas.

Supplemental Brief for Appellant, Prometheus, 628 F.3d 1347 (No. 2008-1403), 2010 WL
4203895, at *2-3. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3257-58 (Breyer & Scalia, J.J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the MorT Test has "repeatedly helped the Court to determine what is a
patentable 'process"' (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (alteration in original))
and remains "an importantexample of how a court can determine patentability under § 101.");
King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("We ... understand
the Supreme Court to have rejected the exclusive nature of our test, but not necessarily the
wisdom behind it."); Appellant Suppl. Br. 2010 WL 4203895, at *6.
Even if this [Federal Circuit] concludes from the Supreme Court's opinion that
satisfaction of the machine-or-transformation test is no longer conclusive, at a
minimum it very strongly suggests that an invention is not merely an abstract
(and thus unpatentable) idea. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (test is "the
clue" to patentability (citation omitted)). That presumption might be rebuttable
in a rare case, but not here.
Id But see Appellee Suppl. Br. 2010 WL 4203894, at *6-7 (noting that the Supreme Court
"envisioned situations in which a claim could meet the machine-or-transformation test yet still
fail to pass muster under Section 101." The Supreme Court's "actions demonstrate that a
different analysis is required of this Court on remand." Id. at *7).
252. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1358-59.
253. Id.
Although a physician is not required to make any upward or downward
adjustment in dosage during the "warning" step, the prior steps provide useful
information for possible dosage adjustments to the method of treatment using
thiopurine drugs for a particular subject. Viewing the treatment methods as a

158

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 17

transformation "of the human body and of its components following the
administration of a specific class of drugs and the various chemical and
physical changes of the drugs' metabolites that enable their
concentrations to be determined." 54 These transformations confine the
patent monopoly, making it sufficiently definite to limit the patent
monopoly within definite bounds for the purpose of administering a
specific compound. 255
The Supreme Court unanimously overruled the Federal Circuit's
decision. 25 The Supreme Court framed the issue as being whether
patent claims containing laws of nature have "enough additional
features" to qualify as genuine applications of laws of nature. 25 7 To be
patent-eligible, these types of patent claims must have claim limitations
whole, Prometheus has claimed therapeutic methods that determine the optimal
dosage level for a course of treatment. In other words, when asked the critical
question, "What did the applicant invent?," Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 (citation
omitted), the answer is a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy
and reduces toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using
particular drugs.
Id.
254. Id. at 1355-56.
Prometheus argued that its asserted claims involve a particular transformation
of a patient's body and bodily sample and use particular machines to determine
metabolite concentrations in a bodily sample (e.g., via high-pressure liquid
chromatography), thus satisfying either prong of the machine-or-transformation
test. Prometheus further argues that its claims also involve an application of a
law of nature, not the law itself, because they recite specific means of treating
specific diseases using specific drugs, and therefore do not preempt the abstract
idea of calibrating drug dosages to treat disease.
Id. at 1342, 1354.
255. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1357. The Federal Circuit compared Prometheus's patent
claims to the not invalid claim in In re Abele,
[t]his analysis is consistent with In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982). In
Abele, a method claim called for the use of X-ray attenuation data, which
necessarily involved production, detection, and display with a CAT scan. The
method also called for use of an algorithm. We found that the claim was
patentable because removal of the algorithm still left all the steps of a CAT
scan in the claim; thus, the production and detection could not be considered
"mere antecedent steps to obtain values for solving the algorithm .... We view
the production, detection, and display steps as manifestly statutory subject
matter, and are not swayed from this conclusion by the presence of an
algorithm in the claimed method." Id. at 908.
Id. at 1358.
256. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 3 (2012).
257. Id. at *2, 8.
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that "limit its reach to a particular, inventive application" and "ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the natural law itself."2 58 The Court was largely silent as to the
Federal Circuit's application of the MorT Test, except to state that a
patent-eligible determination by the MorT Test does not trump the law
of nature exception. 259 The opinion provided new guidance for
determining whether a patent claim is directed simply to an
unpatentable law of nature or instead contains a patent-eligible,
inventive concept that applies a law of nature. 260
The Supreme Court held that Prometheus's claimed processes did
not have "enough" of an "inventive concept" to qualify as a genuine
261
application of a law of nature.21 Instead, the claims were directed
merely to an uninventive application of the laws of nature relating the
concentrations of synthetic thiopurine drugs metabolites in the human
body to the efficacy and toxicity of the administered dosages of those
drugs.2 62 The Court relied heavily on language from Flook. In Flook,
the Supreme Court stated that an application of well-known natural
phenomena or mathematical formulae can be claimed by a patent only if
"there is some other inventive concept" in the application.2 63 In Flook,
the Court also declared that the "obligation to determine what type of
discovery is sought to be patented must precede the determination of
whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious." 264
In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court dissected the claimed
processes in a manner similar to that used in the Federal Circuit's
applications of the MorT Test. After excluding the laws of nature, the
Supreme Court identified three steps in Prometheus's claimed
processes: an "administering" step, a "determining" step, and a

"wherein" step. 265
Viewed in isolation, the first step was disregarded as extra-solution
activity. 26 6 The Court considered this administering step to be merely a
natural process, despite the use of synthetic compounds. The first step
258.

Id at 2-3.

259.

Id at 17.

260. Id at 3-16.
261. Id. at 8, 13.
262. Id. at 8-11. The Court noted that Prometheus's patent claims directed the application
of these "laws of nature" by merely adding "apply it," but this type of an application of a law of
nature is not necessarily patent-eligible. Id at 3.
263. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
264. Id at 593.
265. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 9.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 19. These steps are arguably not natural because they involve technologies,
such as the chemical synthesis and validation of drugs, human activities, and the administration
of a drug. See Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in
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is merely a prerequisite for creating a sample patient for which the laws
of nature have utility. 268 By isolating the first step from the analysis, the
Court held that the administering step did not provide any limitation on
the claim, aside from limiting the use of the natural laws to a particular
environment, that is, a field-of-use restriction. 269 In other words, the
isolated administering step represented merely extra-solution activity to
identify subjects for data gathering.
The Court held that the second step for measuring metabolite
concentrations was merely conventional or obvious extra-solution
activity for gathering the input data required for applying the natural
relationship."o Viewed in isolation, the second step was merely a datagathering step without any limitation on how the data might be
gathered. n Thus, this measuring or determining step also should be
excluded from the analysis based on the Flook doctrine. 272
In discussing the second step, the Court's reasoning stressed that
there already existed well-known methods for gathering these input
data.2 73 The Court held this step merely claimed activities that were
already "well-understood, routine, conventional" and previously
engaged in by laboratory technicians in the health field. 27 4 The Court
also suggested in dictum a refinement to the transformation prong of the
MorT Test by noting that the determining step could be satisfied
without a transformation of blood, "should science develop a totally
Support of Respondent, 2011 WL 5373692, at *9-17; Mayo, 556 U.S. --- ; Brief of Patent Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither party, 2009 WL 462602, at *2-6; Prometheus,
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, the issue of naturalness was immaterial to the Court's
reasoning because all of technologies and human activities claimed were conventional at the
time of invention.
268. Strangely, the Court mentioned that the audience for the output of this natural
correlation is pre-existing, i.e. "doctors who used thiopurine drugs to treat patients suffering
from autoinmmune disorders." Id. at 9. It is difficult to see the relevance of this statement. Did
Benson's patent-eligible rubber curing process using an Arrhenius equation-based algorithm not
have a pre-existing audience?
269. Id. at 9, 15 (The fact that some of Bilski's "claims limited hedging to use in
commodities and energy markets" is not a significant limitation on an abstract idea because
"limiting an abstract idea to one field of use of adding token post-solution components did not
make the concept patentable").
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id. (this step "tells the doctor to determine the level of the relevant metabolites in the
blood, through whatever process the doctor or the laboratory wishes to use").
272. Id. at 9-10, 17; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
273. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 3, 10, 19 (2012)
(However, the Supreme Court is inconsistent by suggesting that the determining or measuring
step "tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by scientists who work in the field" but then later stated that this "step could be
satisfied without transforming the blood, should science develop a totally different system for
determining metabolite levels that did not involve such a transformation").
274. Id.
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metabolite"
thiopurine
determining
system
for
different
concentrations. 275
Finally, the court held in Mayo v. Prometheus that the third step
merely instructed the use of routine technology to consider these natural
laws to obtain knowledge for future decision making. 276 In addition, the
Court considered the entire claimed methods as a whole and found no
synergy created by the ordered combination of steps that satisfied its
27
standard for an inventive concept.27
The Court's reasoning focused on
the lack of any inventive concept in the claimed processes after
subtracting out the laws of nature. 2 78 The Court stressed that these
claimed processes, minus the use of any law of nature, involved "wellunderstood, routine, conventional" activities and data gathering methods
already well known in the art.279 The Court seemed to hold that the
addition of a non-novel (as in section 102) or obvious (as in section
103) pre-solution activity to a law of nature, natural phenomenon,
abstract idea, or mathematical formula is not sufficient to transform that
into a patent-eligible application.2 80
The Court acknowledged that, although it was already known in the
field that thiopurine metabolite concentrations were correlated with
thiopurine clinical efficacy and tolerance, the inventors of the patented
processes were the first to disclose knowledge regarding more precise
prediction of toxicity and efficacy. 281 This could be described as an
improvement over the prior art. However, the Court held that the
claimed processes were built around natural laws and the patent

275. Id. at 19 (However, the scope of the claim would be limited to the enabled methods
and probably under section 112 6 to structure recited in the specification for being functional
claim language).
276. Id. at 9 (The Court felt that the claims recommended considering the applications of
these natural laws, but these applications were unpatentable because they consisted only of
conventional steps.).
277. Id. at 10-11. This consideration by the Supreme Court, albeit cursory, seemed to
comply with the Diehr precedent that the "claims must be considered as a whole." Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). However, it is not clear whether the Court dissected out the
natural law during this ordered-combination-of-steps analysis.
278. Mayo, 556 U.S. at *3, 9-11.
279. Id. at 10.
280. See id. at *3 ("Further support for the view that simply appending conventional steps,
specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable is provided in O'Reilly v. Morse, 15
How. 62, 114-115, 14 L.Ed. 601; Neilson v. Harford, Webster's Patent Cases 295, 371;
Bilski... ; and Benson . . . at 64, 65, 67, 93 S. Ct. 253 Pp. 1300-1301."). This approach is
contrary to the precedent that "[t]he 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89.
281. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 5.
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draftsperson had merely added uninventive and insignificant steps.282
This reasoning shows that whatever improvement made to the precision
of these natural, laws by Prometheus, this improvement is not patenteligible because a more refined natural law is still a natural law.
In holding invalid Prometheus's claims, the Supreme Court
reiterated the underlying policy behind the law of nature exception:
allowing the patenting of natural laws and principles runs the danger of
inhibiting future innovation because natural laws and principles are "the
basic tools of scientific and technological work."2 3 In response to
Prometheus's argument that the law of nature involved in these claims
was very narrow, the Court responded that even a narrow law of nature
might inhibit future research and, for all patent claims directed to laws
of nature, the scope of inhibition is relative to the scope of the
discovery.2 8 4 If Prometheus's claims contributed a smaller value of
discovery, then the claims preempt or inhibit a narrower area of future
research. 8 Furthermore, the Court responded that there is no precedent
for distinguishing among either the scope of natural laws or the amount
of future innovation affected; furthermore, the judiciary is not well
suited for these types of judgments.2 8 6
At the end of the opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the
arguments of the U.S. Government in support of finding patent-eligible
Prometheus's patent claims.2 87 The government argued that the
application of section 101 should be restrained from broadly linking
anything to underlying natural processes or natural laws and, instead
other sections of the patent statute should perform the heavy lifting.289
The Supreme Court responded that this would turn the law of nature
282. Id. at *3, 18 (noting previous precedents' warnings "against interpreting patent
statutes in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art' without
reference to the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for" natural phenomena
and laws of nature) (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62,112-20 (1853)).
283. Id. at 17-18 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67); see also Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 2012
WL 164439, at *16 (Fed. Cir. 2012 (the court held that the patent claims were invalid "as being
directed to an abstract [] idea that would foreclose innovation in this area").
284. Id. at 19-20 (The Court seemed to transform the "preemption-by-application" test of
Benson, which inquired into whether other applications are precluded from using a fundamental
principle or abstract idea, into a "preemption-of-innovations" test that inquired whether the
other researchers are precluded from building innovations upon a law of nature, fundamental
principle or abstract idea).
285. Id.
286. Id
287. Id. at 20-22.
288. See Brief of Nine Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2011
WL 4071921, at *28-37; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 3, 10,
19 (2012) ("If the 'natural' character of that link were sufficient to trigger the 'law of nature'
exception to patent-eligibility under Section 101, the exception would swallow the rule").
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exception into "a dead letter." 289 The Court was concerned that the
government's approach would permit an unpatentable discovery to
survive sections 102 and 103 scrutiny based on its novel law of nature,
while having already passed through the section 101 filter based on its
addition of entirely non-novel activities or steps. 290
The Supreme Court suggested that an unpatentable discovery should
not pass muster under section 101 based on the presence of non-novel,
obvious or otherwise non-inventive machines or transformations and,
then, be able to pass muster under sections 102 and 103 based on its
novel discovery of a law of nature or natural correlation.291 However,
because sections 102 and 103 might fail to filter out these unpatentable
discoveries, the Court held that section 101 plays a vital role in filtering
out unpatentable claims and must take into consideration both novelty

and obviousness. 292
III. CAN THE PRECEDENTS BE RECONCILED?
The USPTO tried to distinguish medical diagnostic methods from
Bilski's patent claims by characterizing the patentability of medical
diagnostic methods as a "much harder question." 293 The Supreme Court
mentioned the argument that the patentability of advanced diagnostic
medicine techniques under an exclusive MorT Test is uncertain and
emphasized that nothing in the majority opinion was intended to
comment on the patentability of these diagnostic methods. 294
Although patenting a medical diagnostic method, such as a blood
test to diagnose a disease, seems like a specific field, a medical
diagnostic is just a subset of a larger group of diagnostic methods.29 5
289. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 21.
290. Id.; see Brief of Nine Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2011
WL 4071921, at *28-37; Mayo, 556 U.S. at 21.
291. See Mayo, 556 U.S. at 21. The Supreme Court used various descriptors that might be
considered synonyms for a lack of novelty or nonobviousness: "well-understood, routine,
conventional," "previously engaged in" by persons skilled in the field and "well known in the
art." Id. at 4, 10-11, 13. Does the Court's avoidance of the legal terms of art "novelty" and "nonobviousness" signal the analysis of the Mayo-Flook approach is not limited to these wellestablished legal standards?
292. Id. at 21-22.
293. Jackman & Holoubek, supra note 7, at 33.
294. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227-28 (plurality opinion).
295. Here are two examples of non-medical diagnostic processes. Example 1, a diagnostic
process applied to a human-made machine is represented by a nuclear reactor meltdown alarm:
1) monitor temperature in nuclear reactor; 2) if temperature > 5000*F, then initiate alarm for
reactor danger. Example 2, a diagnostic process based on natural phenomena is represented by
tropical cyclone predictor: 1) monitor temperature in ocean near tropical depression; 2) analyze
temperature data to determine the ocean temperature at depths of at least 150 ft.; 3) if the ocean
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First, any diagnostic process depends on information that is used to
make a specific diagnosis or, at least, a useful prediction. Second, the
end result is informative to a future course of action, such as a course of
treatment or preventive measures. Third, the requisite input data can be
gathered in different ways before solving the diagnostic algorithm.
Fourth, the central purpose of a diagnostic process is a human actionthe mental step of recognizing what the information suggests based on
contemporary knowledge.
A. Do Medical DiagnosticMethods Threaten to Preempt Laws of
Nature, NaturalPhenomena, or Abstract Ideas?
Medical diagnostic processes most often are based on empirically
measured correlations between naturally occurring features of the
human body. These correlations have been referred to in litigation and
legal literature as natural phenomena and laws of nature. 296 However,
the main issue is whether these processes are ineligible because they are
directed to an abstract idea, not to natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Diagnostic methods attempt to apply rules derived from observations
about natural phenomenon to predict or presume a medical condition.
Diagnostic methods, at their core, represent the act of predicting or
presuming based on information which could be a purely mental act.
The differences between a law of nature, natural phenomenon, and
abstract idea have been confused by the Supreme Court. 297 The Federal
temperature > 800 F at a depth of at least 150 ft., then predict that the tropical depression likely
will become a tropical cyclone.
296. E.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1355 ("Plaintiffs respond that these method claims are drawn to the abstract idea of
comparing one sequence to a reference sequence and preempt a phenomenon of nature-the
correlation of genetic mutations with a predisposition to cancer.") (emphasis added);
Prometheus Lab. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 628 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Mayo
contended that the patents impermissibly claim naturalphenomena-the correlations between,
on the one hand, thiopurine drug metabolite levels and, on the other hand, efficacy and
toxicity") (emphasis added); Metabolite, 548 U.S. at 135 ("There can be little doubt that the
correlation between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13 is a 'natural
phenomenon."') (emphasis added); id. at 137 ("At most, respondents have simply described the
natural law at issue in the abstract patent language of a 'process."') (emphasis added); Brief of
the Appellees, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology,for the Federal Circuit, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, (Nov. 30, 2010) (No. 2010-1406), 2010
WL5311467 ("[Tlhe claim exemplifies how a patent on a general correlation between a gene
and disease monopolizes a law of nature.") (emphasis added).
297. See, e.g., Mayo, 556 U.S. at 20 ("the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like") (emphasis added);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
"inclusion of the ambiguous concept of an 'algorithm' within the 'law of nature' category"). For
the purposes of the new Mayo doctrine, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between the
exceptions, instead lumping together laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, as
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Circuit pointed this out:
The Supreme Court has not been clear, however, as to whether
such subject matter is excluded from the scope of § 101 because
it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186, 101 S.Ct. at 1056 (viewed
mathematical algorithm as a law of nature); Benson, 409 U.S. at
71-72, 93 S.Ct. at 257 (treated mathematical algorithm as an

"idea"). 298
In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court referred to the
correlations between thiopurine dosages, metabolite correlations and
biological effect as both laws of nature and natural relations. 299 The
Court clearly defined "the relationships between the concentration in the
blood of certain thiopurine metabolites and the likelihood that the drug
dosage will be ineffective or induce harmful side-effects" as laws of
nature. 300
However, these correlations are not laws of nature because they lack
sufficient universality and fundamental position in science. The Court
revealed this by noting that "the way in which people metabolize
thiopurine compounds varies the same dose of a thiopurine drug affects
different people differently."3 o1
Laws of nature are "human-made" generalizations about nature that
are consistent with empirical observations of the universe. In principle,
all laws of nature are falsifiable. This is because they have been
empirically tested in ways that can disprove them. As humanity
increases its observations about the universe, then any inconsistencies
can be discovered.
In order for a generalization about a relationship in the natural world
to rise to the level of a scientific law of nature, it must be fairly broad
constant, and uniform to become a foundation of a field of science.301
Common examples of laws of nature are Sir Isaac Newton's laws of
motion. Take Newton's second law, which can be expressed either in
words or as a mathematical formula.303 This law, more commonly
well as the legal standards from Diehr, Benson, and Flook. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 11, 20, 22
(referring to laws of nature and abstract ideas like algorithms as "equivalent" or a basic
mathematical equation as "like" a law of nature).
298. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
299. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 8.
300. Id. at 3.
301. Id. at 4.
302.

See ELISHA BARTLETT, AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICAL SCIENCE 28, 200-

01, 281-82 (1844).
303. Sir Newton first expressed his celebrated second law of motion as a point source's
"change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place along the
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known as F=ma, accurately describes most contemporaneous
observations of motion, momentum and inertia; however, this law of
nature does not strictly represent an absolute truth because it was later
found to be inaccurate in some situations. 304
A natural phenomenon is any state or process in the universe that
occurs or exists.305 Although natural phenomena often are described and
predicted by humanity's laws of nature, phenomenon are individual
manifestations that are confined by all natural principles upon which the
universe is based, regardless of humanity's awareness of them. Natural
phenomena are typically thought of as not including anthropogenic
phenomena, that is, states or process created, induced or contributed to
or by human beings. 30 6 A natural law describes multiple, natural
phenomena and predicts future natural phenomena.
Thus, laws of nature attempt to generalize sets of natural
phenomena. For example, a Vitamin B 12 deficiency is a natural
phenomenon, and the correlation of this state to the concentration of
homocysteine in the human blood stream is a natural phenomenon. The
generalization that elevated homocysteine levels likely indicates a
Vitamin B12 deficiency is akin to a law of nature. However, the act of
diagnosing, which involves the mental thought realizing the diagnosis
of a B 12 deficiency is neither a natural phenomenon nor a law of a
straight line in which that force is impressed." SIR ISAAC NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIk NATURALIS

PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1687);

see George Smith, "Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis

PrincipiaMathematica," s. 5, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (winter 2008 Edition)

(Edward N. Zalta ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entires/ newton-principial
("The modem F=ma form of Newton's second law nowhere occurs in any edition of the

Principia.').
304. Newton's second law is now viewed as only an approximation. In numerous
situations, other forces become significant such that "F=ma" is inaccurate. These situations
include when 1) mass is not constant, 2) the subject is a low-energy subatomic particle, and 3)
fits the velocity of the subject is approaching the speed of light. For example, Einstiin's special
theory of relativity published in 1905 showed that Newton's second law breaks down as
velocities approach the speed of light. Albert Einstein, Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Kdrper, 17
ANNALEN DER PHYSIK 891-921 (1905). Despite these caveats, on the macroscopic scale and over

the vast range of practical energies and forces, Newton's second law of motion works
spectacularly well and is the foundation of a large fraction of physics and engineering. The
Supreme Court has referred to the section 101 exceptions as representing scientific truths.
McKay Radio v. RCA, 305 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) ("a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not patentable invention"). But what is a scientific truth if many of Euclid's
proofs of geometric theorems believed to be true for centuries were found incorrect over 2,000
years later? See generally E.T. BELL, MEN OF MATHEMATICS 294-306 (1986).

305. C. Dilworth, Principles, Laws, Theories and the Metaphysics of Science, 101
SYNTHESE 223, 224-25 (1994).
306. This distinction is difficult to maintain in some situations. For example, when the
behavior of humans is considered by the fields of behavior genetics or evolutionary psychology,
it is not clear what is categorized as a natural phenomenon versus the free will of the individual

person.
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nature-it might be either an act of man or of a human-made machine. 30 7
This kind of mental act should not be categorized under the naturalphenomenon or law-of-nature exception because it best fits under the
abstract-idea exception.
Medicine often relies on guidelines or rules-of-thumb that lack
sufficient universality and fundamentality to be properly labeled as laws
of nature.308 For example, humans differ significantly from each other
because of differences in their behaviors, environments, genetic
backgrounds, and the complex interactions among these factors.
Physicians can use correlations tentatively in the majority of situations
with the knowledge that there are exceptions to the correlations. 309
However, it is not scientifically proper to label these guidelines (or
rules-of-thumb) as "laws of nature." In addition, clinical guidelines may
involve other considerations, such as cost-effectiveness and sociological
factors. 310
Prometheus's claimed processes as a whole involved many human
activities that threaten to cross into the abstract rather than tying up a
physical phenomenon or law of nature.3 1 1 While in isolation the
metabolism of a heterocyclic aromatic compound consisting of a
thiopyrimidine and imidazole rings is a natural process, the human
interventions of giving a drug and monitoring its half-life to readjust its
307. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, C.J., dissenting).
The distinction is simple but critical: A patient may suffer from the
unpatentable phenomenon of nature, namely high homocysteine levels and low
folate. But the invention does not attempt to claim that natural phenomenon.
Instead the patent claims a process for assaying a patient's blood and then
analyzing the results with a new process that detects the life-threatening
condition. Moreover, the sick patient does not practice the patented invention.
Instead the patent covers a process for testing blood that produces a useful,
concrete, and tangible result: incontrovertible diagnostic evidence to save lives.
The patent does not claim the patent-ineligible relationship between folate and
homocysteine, nor does it foreclose future inventors from using that
relationship to devise better or different processes. Contrary to the language of
the dissent, it is the sick patient who "embod[ies] only the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency," Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 137, not the
claimed process.
Id.
308.

J. Saunders, The Practiceof Clinical Medicine as an Art and as a Science, 26 J. MED.

ETHICS: MED. HUMAN. 18-22 (2000).

309. Id.; see BARLETT, supra note 302, at 146 ("certainty in medicine is much more
approximate than absolute").
3 10. J. Mason, A Framework for Incorporating cost-effectiveness in Evidence-based
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 47 HEALTH POL'Y 37-52 (1999); J. Green & N. Britten,
QualitativeResearch andEvidence Based Medicine, 316 BMJ 1230-32 (1998).
311. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 3, 16 (2012).
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dosage is a non-natural process by definition because this is dependent
on human intervention.312 Thus, the entire process is the monitoring of
anthropogenic phenomena. The Supreme Court noted that the claimed
processes suggest taking the correlations into account to draw an
inference in light of the correlations. 3 13 Thus, the Court implied that the
claimed processes were applications; however, the applications lacked
any inventive concept aside from just applying the natural correlations.
A lingering question is whether the claimed processes were too abstract
to be patent-eligible.
B. Medical DiagnosticMethods Often Violate the
Abstract-IdeaException
The predominant issue for diagnostic methods under section 101
should be whether the application as a whole is too abstract to be
unpatentable. Contrary to the approach in Mayo v. Prometheus, the
application's inventiveness could be predominantly an issue defined by
other sections of the patent statute. Metabolite's or Prometheus's
patents claim the mental act of thinking about or using knowledge about
a natural phenomenon. The problem is whether a patent is preempting
the use of knowledge as an abstract idea-regardless of if the
knowledge is about the natural universe. The diagnostic method claim is
most like Benson's rubber curing process based on the Arrhenius
equation-which epitomizes the abstract-idea exception.
Although the abstract-idea exception traditionally has been applied
to mathematical algorithms, it now is being used to exclude mental acts
and actions that can be performed by a human without a machine, such
as hedging risk in energy-commodity trading. 3 14 If a claimed process
consists only of steps that can be performed merely by a human and
there is no limitation to it being performed by a machine, then it is
ineligible subject matter.3 15
Most people would agree that a correlation between serum
concentrations of homocysteine or thiopurine metabolites and Vitamin
B 12 deficiencies or the efficacy or toxicity of a given thiopurine dosage
312. See Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent, 2011 WL 5373692, at *9-18.
313. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 9-11, 18.
314. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("We concluded that the claims were
instead drawn to the 'mental process' of arbitrating disputes, and that claims to such an
'application of [only] human intelligence to the solution of practical problems' is no more than a
claim to a fundamental principle.") (quoting Gotschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
315. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at *6 (Such a method that can be performed by human
thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.); In re Comiskey,
554 F.3d at 980 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence
alone to solve practical problems are not within the scope of Section 101.").
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in humans is an ineligible subject matter for being either a physical
phenomenon or akin to a law of nature; however, this correlation might
be utilized in an application within the diagnostic context. The question
is, under what conditions and limits is the use of this correlation a
patent-eligible application?
The following examples demonstrate when diagnostic methods are,
or are not, applications of an abstract idea based on correlations
between specific information and the chance the subject of interest has
(or might develop) a particular disease.
Example of Medical Diagnostic Process #1:
1) collecting body tissue from subject;
2) processing and analyzing tissue to quantitate factor X; and
3) if X > #, then making diagnosis of disease Y.
This process could be written simply as "I claim the method of
diagnosing disease Y based on the knowledge that X > # is correlated
with the incidence of disease Y."
Is this example patent-eligible? No, this is an example of ineligible
subject matter.3 First, the claimed process in essence is the "action" of
diagnosing a patient using the knowledge that the incidence of a disease
Y correlates with the quantity of X in the patient.
The claim drafter could attempt to narrow the claimed process by
including a limitation in step 2 that required that the amount of X must
be measured using specific methods tied to machines and
transformations. Similarly, the claim drafter could try to narrow the
claim by including specific steps after making the diagnosis, such as
adding a step 4 that recited a detailed therapeutic protocol to treat
disease Y.
However, steps 1 and 2 should be excluded under the Flook doctrine
of extra-solution activity because these are requisite steps to solve the
"diagnostic algorithm." This approach is consistent with In re Grams.3 17
This leaves only step 3, which fails to pass muster under the MorT
Test. Step 3 is a human act based on an unpatentable abstract-idea. This
human act could be considered the act of thinking about the diagnosis
implicated by the claimed process or communicating a diagnosis
implicated by the claimed process to another person, medical chart, or
316. See Collins, supra note 7, at 42 (Prof. Collins might categorize Example #1 as an
unpatentable abstract idea because it solely describes a mental process in isolation); Parasidis,
supra note 4, at 397.
317. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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computer system.3 1 8
Now, what about the overriding preemption test? Although Example
#1 does not preempt all diagnosis of disease Y or any method of
measuring factor X, it appears to preempt all diagnosing of disease Y
based solely on the amount of factor X. The preemption test asks
whether the idea of correlating X with Y was wholly preempted in all
practical applications or such that there is "no substantial practical
application."'
Again, after excluding the extra-solution steps, the
claimed process is reduced to step 3, which fails to satisfy the
preemption test.
Example #1 is basically the same as the claim at issue in Metabolite.
Thus, Metabolite was wrongly decided by the Federal Circuit because
the transformative step was mere data gathering and the remaining
process consisted merely of a mental step that was not limited from
being performed by a person. 320 In Prometheus, District Judge John
Houston suggested this view by arguing that the dissent in Metabolite
was persuasive. 32 1 The district court's discussion was contrary to the
Federal Circuit's ruling in Metabolite and implied that Metabolite's
patent claim at issue in Metabolite should have been held invalid for
violating the abstract-idea exception.322
The claim drafter could attempt to narrow the claimed process by
including specific steps after making the diagnosis, such as a step 4 that
recited a detailed therapeutic protocol to treat disease Y:323
318. For example, LabCorp's patent (U.S. Patent 4,940,658) "was found to be infringed
based primarily on a physician's mental correlation of homocysteine and vitamin B levels."
Holman, supra note 5, at 542.
319. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
320. SmartGene, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d at *10, *16, *20 (holding patent ineligible a medicaldiagnosis, expert systems because they did "no more than describe [] an abstract mental process
engaged in routinely, either entirely within a physician's mind, or potentially aided by other
resources in the treatment of patients.").
321. Prometheus Lab. v. Mayo Collaborative, 628 F.3d 1347, 1359 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011).
322. Id. at 1354-59.
323. This format of drafting claims is disfavored by practitioners because process patent
protection is significantly weakened when more than one party could perform different steps in
the process. See generally BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379-81 (Fed.
Cir 2007) (holding that Paymentech did not infringe patents when they did not perform, direct or
control all the parties carrying out various steps in a patented processes).
For process patent or method patent claims, infringement occurs when a party
performs all of the steps of the process .... Indirect infringement requires, as a
predicate, a finding that some party amongst the accused actors has committed
the entire act of direct infringement . . . the law imposes vicarious liability on a
party for the acts of another in circumstances showing that the liable party
controlled the conduct of the acting party ... This court acknowledges that the
standard requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may
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Example of Medical Diagnostic Process #2:
1) collecting body tissue from subject;
2) processing and analyzing tissue to quantitate factor X;
3) if X > #, then making diagnosis of disease Y; and
4) treating disease Y using method Z.
Again the first two steps can be excluded under the Flook doctrine of
extra-solution activity because these are requisite steps to solve the
"algorithm." However, the essence of the claimed process has changed
to the "action" of treating a patient using the knowledge that the
incidence of a disease Y correlates with the quantity of X in the patient.
Although the third step is a human action, the mere presence of an
abstract step does not make the process ineligible. 324 Thus, the
eligibility of the entire claimed process depends on step 4.
In Mayo, the Supreme Court suggested that the patent-eligibility of
this example would turn on whether step 4 had any inventive concept.
After Mayo, the courts should consider the new natural law exception
prior to the MorT Test for the abstract exception. After identifying a
natural law in step 3, the analysis would be on step 4 and the entire
claim as a whole. If step 4 simply consists of routine, well-known
activities then it cannot pass muster under the law of nature exception.
In addition, the entire claim as a whole should be considered for any
synergistic results that might provide the inventive concept. This
example would pass the natural law exception if step 4 alone involved a
"non-conventional" therapy that was not previously engaged in by
others skilled in the art. Then, the MorT Test should be performed to
in some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to
avoid infringement.
Id. at 1379-80; Muniuaction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(citing Paymentech, 498 F.3d at 1380-81).
[W]where the actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a
claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises
"control or direction" over the entire process such that every step is attributable
to the controlling party, i.e., the "mastermind." . . . the control or direction
standard is satisfied in situations where the law would traditionally hold the
accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another
party.
Id. (i.e., principal-agency theory).
324. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-92 (1978).
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screen out abstract ideas.
Step 4 is capable of satisfying the MorT Test. With regard to the
machine prong, the treatment method Z might require the use of a
machine or apparatus that is central to the purpose of the process-to
diagnosis and then treat the subject. With regard to the transformation
prong, the treatment method Z might transform the subject by
ameliorating the symptoms of the disease. However, all of this is moot
if step 4 is parsed out of the analysis pursuant to the MorT Test
corollary of post-solution activity. In addition, passing muster under the
MorT Test is irrelevant if the claimed process fails the overriding
preemption test.
According to the majority in Classen, step 4 should not be excluded
from the eligibility analysis. 32 5 This step could be considered
fundamental to the central purpose of the claimed process-an invention
to treat*a patient based on an ineligible correlation or abstract idea that
was then applied to a real world situation to provide a concrete and
transformative result. The Federal Circuit seems to prefer this approach,
at least in the medical diagnostic context.
However, step 4 could be considered post-solution activity under the
Flook doctrine.26 Judge Moore's dissent in Classen argued for
excluding such process steps from the abstract-exception analysis. 327
This seems like the more consistent approach. The Federal Circuit could
be accused of trying too hard to protect diagnostic methods, perhaps for
unmentioned policy reasons. On the other hand, Chief Judge Rader's
comments in Classen suggest a general desire of the Federal Circuit to
limit section 101 to a coarse filter.3 28 Coarse means that the legal
standard should not rigidly be used to exclude borderline processes,
such as Example #2, unless it is "so manifestly abstract 'as to override
the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter and the statutory
context that directs primary
attention on the patentability criteria of the
329
rest of the Patent Act."'
325. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1065-67 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
326. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227-28 (plurality opinion).
327. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1076 (Moore, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 2073-75 (Rader & Newman, J.J., additional views); see MySpace, Inc. v.
GraphOn Corp., 2012 WL 716435, at *7-8 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("courts should avoid reaching for
interpretations of board provisions, such as § 101, when more specific statutes, such as §§ 102,
103, and 112, can decide the case"); Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1325-26,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("eligibility is a 'coarse' gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter
categories for patent protection . . . The 'coarse eligibility filter' of § 101 should not be used to
invalidate patents based on concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, or lack of
enablement, as these infirmities are expressly addressed by § 112."); Research Corp., 627 F.3d
at 869.
329. Id. at 1066-67 (quoting Research Corp. Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868
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The next example considers a drug therapy management method.
This example is a Prometheus-style process claim.
Example of Medical Diagnostic Process #3:330
0) treating subject for disease Y with drug Z;
1) collecting body tissue from subject;
2) analyzing tissue to quantitate factor X;
3) if X > #, then calculating new dosage of drug Z based on
knowledge about the relationship between X and Z; and
4) treating subject for disease Y with adjusted dosage of drug Z.
Again, the first three steps should be excluded under the Flook
doctrine of extra-solution activity because these are requisite datagathering steps to solve the "diagnostic algorithm." However, this was
not done by the Federal Circuit in Prometheus, either initially or after
the case was remanded by the Supreme Court. 33 1 The Federal Circuit
held that these steps are not only required by the algorithm but also
serve the more central purpose of treating the patient with a beneficial
drug therapy. 332 Even if this argument is accepted, steps 1 and 2 should
be excluded because they serve only the purpose of gathering data
required by the algorithm. Thus, the only way to hold this example
eligible is to find that either step 0 or 3 satisfy the MorT Test.
In the now overruled Prometheus, the Federal Circuit found the
claimed process steps both transformative and central to the purpose of
the whole invention, which was a medical treatment protocol.
The
Federal Circuit only applied the transformation prong of the MorT Test
in both Prometheus decisions; therefore, it is unknown if the court
would have found the machine prong satisfied by Prometheus's claims.
Thus, the essence of the claimed process is treating a patient with a
drug using the knowledge that the quantity of X in the patient correlates
to the pharmacokinetics of the drug for that particular patient. Step 4 is
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
330. Although this example is not a disease diagnostic, it is a diagnostic in the sense it
alerts or informs the user about the status or operation of a system. For example, diagnostic
method could describe an engine-safety feedback system. Supra note 295.
331. Prometheus Lab. v. Mayo Collaborative, 628 F.3d 1347, 1359 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
332. Id. at 1355-57; Prometheus Labs. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336,
1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
333. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1355-59.
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linked to step 0, forming a recursive loop of treatment. Start with
dosage, of drug Z, and then, after performing one claimed process
cycle, treat again with dosagei+i of drug Z.
As in example #2, the unresolved issue is whether the last step is
excluded from the eligibility analysis or not. This step could be
considered post-solution activity under the Flook doctrine. However,
this step could also be considered fundamental to the central purpose of
the claimed process, which is an invention to treat a patient based on an
ineligible correlation or abstract idea that was then applied to a real
world situation to provide a concrete result. 334 Again the Federal Circuit
seems to prefer the latter alternative, at least in the medical diagnostic
context.
In addition, the fourth step could be viewed as post-solution activity.
Any health care provider making this correlation in step four could only
use it to either gain knowledge about the patient's condition and to
change the dosage of the drug based on knowledge. Some
commentators probably would disagree with the Federal Circuit
precedents in Classen, Prometheus and Metabolite, and find that
Example #3 represents a patent-ineligible process.335
After the Supreme Court held in Mayo that this type of claim lacks
any synergistic result, the patent eligibility of this claim hinges on the
fourth step's possession of enough additional features to rise to the level
of an inventive concept. If step 4 simply consisted of routine, wellknown activities previously engaged in by others, then the claimed
process cannot pass muster under the law of nature exception.
What if the claim involved a pure medical procedure aside from the
drug administration to the patient?
Example of Medical Diagnostic Process #4:
1) treating subject for disease Y with drug Z;
2) observing efficacy by assessing degree of signs and symptoms
using interview;
3) if treatment not effective, then adjusting dosage of drug Z
higher; and
4) treating subject for disease Y with adjusted dosage of drug Z.

334. There is a tension between the gist of the invention and parsing out of extra-solution
activities. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3235 (2010) (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer &
Sotomayor, J.J., concurring).
335. See Parasidis,supra note 4, at 397-98; Yu, supranote 7, at 427-37.

2012]

PATENTING MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC METHODS: THE MORT STRIKES BACK

175

In this example, there is no transformation or machine recited in
steps 2 or 3. However, it is very similar to Example #4 except that step
2 can be performed by a human without the aid of any technology.
Based on the now overruled Prometheus, the Federal Circuit likely
would find the purpose of the claim is to treat the patient and that the
drug Z transforms the human body. Within this reasoning, a recursive
loop is formed by steps 1 and 4, both of which continue to be
transformative. This example might be the least machine and
transformative, Prometheus-style claim that passes muster under the
MorT Test because, unlike in Prometheus, this example lacks any
machine, such as a high-pressure, liquid chromatography apparatus.
Perhaps this resembles the business method of claim 6 of Bilski's
rejected patent application. 336 Based on Mayo, this type of claim lacks
any synergistic result when all the steps are considered as a whole.
Under the Mayo-Flook approach, this example would not be patent
eligible if steps 2-4 simply consisted of conventional, routine, and
already known activities after subtracting out all "laws of nature."
Under the reasoning of Mayo, this example claim as a whole probably
lacks any synergy rising to the level of an inventive concept.
What if the claimed process clearly requires a machine? The
following example represents the case where the algorithm provides
data processing that cannot be done by a human without a machine.
However, the end result might be an image that currently only humans
such as a specialized radiologist, can reliably and accurately interpret. 33
Example of Medical Diagnostic Process #5:
1) scanning subject with a specialized, medical machine;
2) collecting and processing machine data using specialized
software;
3) analyzing data using software run on a computer to reveal
diagnostically valuable information; and
4) using machine-derived information to make diagnostic or
treatment decisions.
336. U.S. Patent No. 08/833,892 (filed Apr. 10, 1996).
337. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,901,280 (filed May 6, 2003) & 6,595,211 (filed Aug. 2,
2001). The '280(B2) patent claims a specialized Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) process of
tracking joint pathologies to monitor the progression of rheumatic diseases affecting cartilage.
Similarly, the '211(B2) patent claims a specialized MRI-based process to measure oxygen
exchange in various lung compartments. This information could be useful to diagnosis or
monitor a disease, although that step is not claimed.
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First, the invention as a whole serves to provide medically useful
information via the use of software "algorithms" which process data in a
computer. The most important query is which steps are excluded for
being mere data-gathering steps. Step 1 should be excluded for being
requisite data gathering. Step 2 appears to contain the algorithm run on
a computer. If step 3 can be performed by a human, then it is ineligible
because it recites no limitation to a particular machine. 338 Finally, step 4
is clearly post-solution activity that should be excluded. Thus, the
abstract-idea exception analysis must consider only step 2.
Step 2 represents data transformations on a computer where the data
is related to real-world objects, such as the patient's body. The
eligibility of this type of process is unclear after Bilski. Some argue that
when the resulting data represent real-world, tangible objects displayed
on a computer screen, then a transformation has occurred within the
ambit of the MorT Test.33 9 If steps 2 and 3 are very comlicated, then
this might be a clue that the method is patent-eligible. 34 In addition,
338. Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1357 (holding that a determining step necessarily required a
transformation when the metabolite concentrations could not be determined by mere inspection)
("Some form of manipulation .. . is necessary to extract the metabolites from a bodily sample
and determine their concentration."). See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 556
U.S. 3, 9 (2012).
339. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978); CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d. 221, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The Federal Circuit recently grappled with its "measured approach" to allowing
the manipulation of electronic signals or data or even "abstract constructs,"
such as legal obligations, to qualify as transformations under the Patent Act.
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. The Federal Circuit pointed to only one example where
"the electronic transformation of the data itself into a visual depiction" was
sufficient to meet the test. Id. at 963 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-09
(C.C.P.A. 1982)). It was not the mere manipulation of data itself that led the
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the predecessor to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) to find the method was transformative, but
that the process involved the conversion of X-ray data into a visual depiction
which represented specific physical objects, i.e., bones. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at
962-63.
Id. at 234; but see Interim Examination Instructionsfor Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 5-6 (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-25_interim_101_instructions.pdf (The transformation prong of the MorT
Test is satisfied with regard to electronic data when "the nature of the data has been changed
such that it has a different function or is suitable for a different use.").
340. Ultramercial,657 F.3d at 1328 (holding patent-eligible an invention that created a
"specific application to the Internet and a cybermarket environment" where the claimed method
contained non-extra-solution computer-based activities that involved "advances in computer
programming" and "required intricate and complex computer programming"); but see
SmartGene, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d at *16 (holding patent ineligible medical-diagnosis, expert
systems consisting of computerized programs for guiding the selection of therapeutic treatment
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tying the process to a specific machine in step 1 or step 2 might be
enough to satisfy the MorT Test. However, the Federal Circuit has
begun to delineate the contours of the transformation prong by
excluding transitory transformations of electromagnetic waves. 34 1
IV. PATENTING MEDICAL DIAGNOSTIC METHODS BASED ON
GENETIC INFORMATION

The diagnostic-method realm is an area in which patenting DNA
molecules and processes of correlating DNA sequence with diseases has
342
caused much of the consternation on display in AMP v. USPTO. This
might be because of the view that genetic information represents natural
information that should be freely available to all.3 43
This reasoning is not supported by any precedent in patent law, and
in fact, there are many precedents to the contrary. 344 You may think that
knowledge about cavities in your teeth should be free for you to know,
but what if the only known way of obtaining the knowledge required the
use of a patented X-ray machine? The policies underlying patent law
promote the invention and patenting of the X-ray machine, even if the
resulting patent owner never practices their invention and refuses to
license it for twenty years thereby preventing you from learning about
cavities by this method. 34 With regard to patent law, there is nothing
regimens for a patient based on input provided by a physician partly based on the reasoning that
"when a computer is functioning simply to speed up a process" . . . "this does not impose a
meaningful limit on the scope of a claim").
341. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that claims to a
signal with an embedded digital watermark encoded according to a claimed process were not
directed to statutory subject matter, although the claims included "physical but transitory forms
of signal transmission such as radio broadcasts, electrical signals through a wire, and light
pulses through a fiber optic cable").
342. See generally Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test
Innovation andAccess, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, % 15-61 (2011).
343. See Saby Ghoshray, InterpretingMyriad: Acquiring Patent Law's Meaning Through
ContemporaryJurisprudenceand Humanistic Viewpoint of Common Heritage of DNA, 10 K.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 508, 530-31 (2011); Yu, supra note 7, at 401.

344. See Durham,supra note 198, at 982.
345. A patent confers the legal right to "suppress" a patented invention by both not
practicing it and excluding others from infringing it. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386, 432 (1945) ("A patent owner is not in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or
under any obligation to see that the public acquires the free right to use the invention. He has no
obligation either to use it or to grant its use to others."); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370
(1945) ("Congress has frequently been asked to change the policy of the statutes as interpreted
by this time, but has not done so."); Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,
429 (1908) ("exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by
the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to sue or not use it, without question of
motive"); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1902) ("the motive which
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unique about DNA sequence information versus other information.
A. Association of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office
Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah patented processes of
comparing DNA sequences from patients with various BRCAl and
BRCA2 gene sequences to diagnose and screen for predispositions to
breast and ovarian cancers.3 0 These BRCAl and BRCA2 gene
sequences were limited to the sequences discovered by Myriad and the
University of Utah.34 7 Two examples of their diagnostic method patent
claims (differing in determining germline versus soma mutations) are
listed below: "A method for detecting a germline alteration in a BRCA 1
gene . . . which comprises analyzing a sequence of a BRCA1 gene or

BRCA1 RNA from a human sample." 348 "A method for screening a
tumor sample ... for a somatic alteration in a BRCA1 gene ... which
comprises

. . . comparing a first sequence . . . with a second

sequence ... from the.. . BRCA 1 gene from a nontumor sample of said
subject." 34 9
The Association of Molecular Pathology (AMP), various scientific,
medical and non-profit groups, physicians, professors, and breast cancer
patients, filed declaratory judgment claims against Myriad, the
University of Utah and the USPTO. AMP alleged that the claimed
prompts [a patentee] to sue is not open to judicial inquiry, because, having a legal right to sue, it
is immaterial whether his motives are good or bad, and he is not required to give his reasons for
the attempt to assert his legal rights"); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90
(1902) (A patentee may suppress his invention or discovery for the life of the patent because a
patent is a grant of private property that neither binds the patent owner to use the discovery nor
permits others to use it); Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) ("a patentee may, if it wishes, do nothing with the subject matter of the patent");
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("there is no requirement in this
country that a patentee make use or sell its patented invention."); United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (patentees have "the
right to suppress the invention while continuing to prevent all others from using it . .. to refuse
to license."). However, the remedies for patent infringement might change based on the fact that
a patentee does not practice their invention. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 392-94 (2006); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1547-48 ("courts have in rare instances exercised their
discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public interest" for the sake of public
health).
346. U.S. Patent Nos. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); 5,710,001 (filed Mar. 24, 1995);
5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) & 6,033,857 (filed Mar. 20, 1998).
347. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995) ("[W]ith the proviso that the
alteration is not a deletion of 4 nucleotides corresponding to base numbers 4184-4187 of SEQ
ID No. I [BRCAl].").
348. '999 Patent clm. 1 (emphasis added).
349. '001 Patent clm. 1 (emphasis added).
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process were invalid because they encompass ineligible subject matter

under 35 U.S.C. § 101.350

Myriad countered that the claimed processes "should not be viewed
as mental processes because they incorporate a transformation step that
satisfies the 'transformation' prong" of the MorT Test. 35 1 Myriad
argued that their claimed processes were like those at issue in
Prometheus. Myriad argued "just as the act of 'determining' metabolite
levels in Prometheus was found to involve the transformation of human
blood, so too should 'analyzing' or 'comparing' BRCAl/2 gene
sequences be construed to incorporate physically transformative steps
(i.e., the isolation and sequencing of DNA) that would satisfy" the

MorT Test. 3 52
The district court held Myriad's methods claims invalid for being
directed only to the abstract mental steps of comparing BRCAI/2
sequence information. 353 The claimed processes represent a single step
of comparing and do not recite "any limitations on the method of
comparison."354
Myriad argued that in Prometheus the court identified transformative
steps not recited in the claims at issue, suggesting that Myriad could
satisfy the transformation prong of the MorT Test by pointing out
transformations implied in their claims from dependent claims or the
patent specification.355 However, the legal standard is whether any
machine or transformation present in the claimed subject matter
provides a meaningful limitation on the claimed process.
First, it should be established whether these allegedly transformative
steps are limiting the claims at all. While certain language in a patent
350. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged the patents violated the Patent
Clause, the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because
the patent claims cover products of nature, laws of nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas and
basic human knowledge. All the Constitutional claims were dismissed by the district court under
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Id. at 237.
351. Id. at 233.
352. Id. at 234.
353. Id. at 236-37.
354. Id. at 234.
355. Reply Brief of the Appellants, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 5650476,
at *25. In SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'1 Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal
Circuit noted that we were "not dealing with ... a method that [could] be performed without a
machine .. .. there is no evidence here that the calculations here [could] be performed entirely
in the human mind." Id. at 1333. Similarly, in Research Corp. Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 627
F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit upheld the patentability of a "claimed method ...
[blecause the method required the manipulation of computer data . . . [that] could not, as a
practical matter, be performed entirely in a human's mind." CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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specification or claim preamble could limit a claim, there was no
support for limiting the patent claims in this case. The mistake of
reading a limitation from the specification into the claims has been
labeled one of the cardinal sins of patent law.316 The district court held
that these limitations are prohibited from being imported into the claim
from the specification or from other dependent claims.3 5 7 The court
continued its analysis in the alternative, showing that even if any of the
alleged transformative steps were present in the claimed processes, such
presence would not render patent-eligible any claimed diagnostic
process.3 5 8
The district court disregarded Myriad's implied DNA sequencegathering step from the analysis because the broad claim language
placed no limitation on the claimed process, or alternatively because
the step could be parsed away as mere requisite data gathering. 59
Isolation and sequencing of DNA from a human sample, even if
incorporated into the method claims-in-suit, would represent
nothing more than data-gathering steps to obtain the DNA
sequence information on which to perform the claimed
comparison or analysis. Moreover, in the absence of a specified
method for isolating and sequencing DNA, [a] requirement
simply that data inputs be gathered--without specifying how--is a
meaningless limit on a claim to an algorithm because every
algorithm inherently requires the gathering of data inputs. Bilski,
545 F.3d at 963 (citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 839-40).
Consequently, even if the method claims in- suit were construed
to include the physical transformations associated with isolating
and sequencing DNA, they would still fail the machine or
for subject-matter
transformation test under § 101

patentability.360
This holding reduced the claimed processes to the act of "sequence
gazing" at two or more BRCA1/2 sequences, that is, analyzing or
comparing. The district court held that Myriad's claimed processes
recited only abstract mental processes-analyzing or comparingactivities which the court found not to be transformative or machinelimited. 36 1 Thus, the claimed processes failed the exclusive MorT Test
356. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing SciMed Life
Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
357. Ass'nfor Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 235-36.
358. Id. at 236.
359. Id. at 234-37.
360. Id. at 236-37 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
361. Id. at 234.
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of the In re Bilski era. Myriad's diagnostic claim could be rewritten as:
Comparing BRCAl sequence from a human to our table of BRCA1
mutant sequences, and then using scientific knowledge disclosed in the
patent specification to detect presence of DNA mutations implicated in
cancer.
On appeal, Myriad argued that
the district court failed to recognize the transformative nature of
the claims by (1) misconstruing the claim term "sequence" as just
information, rather than a physical molecule; and (2) erroneously
concluding, in the alternative, that Myriad's proposed
transformations were mere data-gathering steps, rather than
central to the purpose of the claims. 2
Thus, Myriad argued that the claimed processes do not consist
merely of abstract mental steps because the transformative steps of
extracting and analyzing the sequence of nucleic acids involved the
physical manipulation of human tissue samples. 363
Myriad suggested that the first claim should be rewritten as having at
least three steps:
1. Manipulating human tissue to extract and isolate BRCAl/2
sequence-containing molecules;
2. Manipulating extracted molecules
nucleotide sequence(s); and

to reveal BRCAl/2

3. Analyzing derived nucleotide sequence(s) by comparing it to
specific BRCAl/2 sequences. (The comparison step provides the
utility of detecting mutations that contribute to and/or predispose
subjects toward specific cancers. 364)
Myriad argued that although the comparison step involves only
sequence information, this step cannot be done without comparing the
DNA sequence of known mutations to real world molecules derived
from the patient. 365 Myriad argued that the claimed processes are
362. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
363. Reply Brief for the Appellants, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 5650476,
at *27.
364. Id. at *26.
365. Id. at *28 ("The claims require the use of an extracted human sample, which in and of
itself requires a transformation. Then, DNA sequences (molecules) in the extracted human
sample are themselves transformed by further analysis.").
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specific, functional, and palpable ways of detecting cancerpredisposing abnormalities in a human being .

.

.. They do not

preempt a natural phenomenon, but, rather, utilize a natural
phenomenon as one of a series of particular, specific steps that
limit the application of this principle. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187
("Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical
equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that
equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use
of that equation in conjunction with all the other steps in their

claimed process."). 366
Myriad identified several transformations required to perform the
claimed processes: "the physical manipulation of human tissue or blood
in order to isolate the patient's DNA, and a second, separate hysical
The
manipulation of the isolated DNA itself in sequencing."
dependent claims "'require hybridizing, amplifying, electrophoresing,
and/or cloning"' of those sequences. But these dependent claims would
make no sense if what was being hybridized, amplified, etc. was mere
information.3 6 8
However, Myriad wrongly asserted that these transformations were
central to the purpose of the claims because "each require the
transformation of a tissue or blood sample in order to isolate the
patient's DNA."369 This is clearly contrary to Federal Circuit precedents
of parsing out requisite data-gathering steps for being extra-solution to
any abstract algorithm. While in Prometheus, the Federal Circuit did not
exclude the data-gathering steps because it served another purpose
central to claims aside from its data-gathering purpose, Myriad's
sequence gathering is merely required for data to input into the claimed
diagnostic algorithms. Prometheus does not represent an exception to
the general data-gathering rule, rather it is consistent with the Federal
Circuit precedents.
The Association of Molecular Pathology (AMP) responded that
"Myriad's method claims cover the abstract idea of looking at DNA
sequences and thinking about their significance." 370 Thus, the claimed
processes preclude an abstract idea or mental step, which is the mental
366. Id. at *26.
367. Id. at *27.
368. Id. at *27-28.
369. Id. at *27; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), as amended(Apr. 5, 2010), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 653
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 94515, at *66 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23 2009)).
370. Brief for the Appellees, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 5311467, at *13.
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comparison of DNA sequences with the claimed BRCA sequences.
AMP argued that these claims are drawn to the abstract idea of
comparing one sequence to a reference sequence, which "do[es] not
meet the machine-or-transformation test because the claims' plain
language includes just the one step of 'comparing' or 'analyzing' two
In oral argument, Mr. Hansen submitted that
gene sequences.
Myriad's method claims would be infringed if someone merely
compared a publicly available BRCA mutant sequence and a publicly
available whole human genome sequence, such as that of Dr. George
Church.3 72 Thus, AMP argued that no physical or potentially
transformative activities are required because already sequenced DNA
could be "analyzed" or "compared," resulting in patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit agreed with both the district court and AMP.37 3
This claim thus recites nothing more than the abstract mental
steps necessary to compare two different nucleotide sequences:
look at the first position in a first sequence; determine the
nucleotide sequence at that first position; look at the first position
in a second sequence; determine the nucleotide sequence at that
first position; determine if the nucleotide at the first position in
the first sequence and the first position in the second sequence
are the same or different, wherein the latter indicates an
alternation; and repeat for the next position. 374
Also, like the district court, the Federal Circuit distinguished this
case from Prometheus. In Prometheus, the data-gathering step "was not
just insignificant extra-solution activity or necessary data-gathering
steps but was central to the claims, because determining the metabolite
levels was what enabled the optimization of drug dosage." 375 In
contrast, Myriad's claimed diagnostic processes
do not include the step of "determining" the sequence of BRCA
genes by, e.g., isolating the genes from a blood sample and
sequencing them, or any other necessarily transformative step.
Rather, the comparison between the two sequences can be
371. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
372. Kevin E. Noonan, AMP v. USPTO: Oral Argument at the Federal Circuit,
PatentDocs.org, http://www.patentdoes.org/2011/04/amp-v-uspto-oral-arguments-at-the-federalcircuit.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); Audio: Oral Argument, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), http://oralarguments.cafc.us
courts.gov/default. aspx?fl=2010-1406.mp3.
373. Ass'n for MolecularPathology,653 F.3d at 1355.
374. Id. at 1356.
375. Id. at 1357.
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accomplished by mere inspection alone. Accordingly, Myriad's
claimed methods of comparing or analyzing nucleotide sequences
fail to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test, and are instead
directed to the abstract mental process of comparing two
nucleotide sequences. The claims thus fail to claim a patenteligible process under § 101.376
B. Impact of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc. on the Patentingof Medical DiagnosticsBased on
Genetic Information
The Federal Circuit's reasoning in AMP v. USPTO asserted the
MorT Test was outcome determinative here, as it was also in the now
overturned Prometheus.377
However, the Federal Circuit's opinion leaves important questions
unanswered. One such question is whether the claimed process might be
eligible subject matter if it was drafted to include the limitation- of
determining the DNA sequence of interest. For example, drafted to
include the physical step of isolating DNA from a blood sample and
sequencing it, which involves various physical manipulations such as
hybridization, amplification, electrophoresis, and cloning. 378 i
hindsight, Myriad's claimed process for DNA sequence comparison
might have suffered merely from drafting deficiencies to pass muster
under the MorT Test. 3 79
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit might have found that the
subject matter of Myriad's claimed processes were ineligible no matter
how drafted. 380 Based on the analysis in Part III.B of this Note, the
courts should disregard the DNA sequencing steps as mere data
gathering regardless of the explicit recitation of steps involving
machines and transformation.381 If the very nature of the alleged
invention cannot satisfy section 101, then the barrier to obtaining a
376. Id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1008 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (stating that the MorT Test
can be easily circumvented because by "clever draftsmanship, nearly every process claim can be
rewritten to include a physical transformation"), aff'd but criticizedsub nom. Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
380. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 236-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), as amended (Apr. 5, 2010), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 653 F.3d
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
381. Ass'nfor MolecularPathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 236-37 ("isolation and sequencing
of DNA from a human sample, even if incorporated into the method claims-in-suit, would
represent nothing more than data-gathering of data inputs. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963 (citing Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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patent on the subject matter lies inherently in the invention, not simply
in the words chosen to claim it.
In AMP v. USPTO, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
decision and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit for further
consideration in light of Mayo v. Prometheus.382 The relationship
between a patient's DNA sequence and the probability of having a
disease is a "law of nature" within the ambit of the Supreme Court's
analysis. 3 83 Once identified, this "law of nature" should be set aside and
the remaining process steps analyzed for whether there is any remaining
feature that is not well-understood, routine, conventional, previously
engaged in" by persons skilled in the field and "well known in the art."
A strict parsing out of all natural correlations under the Mayo-Flook
doctrine would mean the end of virtually all diagnostic patents directed
to processes applying correlations of a biological marker to disease
prognosis or incidence. 384 For genetic information-based correlations,
any diagnostic methods claim would almost always be conventional and
the component of the claim providing the inventive concept would be
disregarded as a "natural law." The utility, novelty, and nonobviousness
of such innovations almost always originate from the natural relations
considered to be "laws of nature" in Mayo.
In addition, the Mayo-Flook approach might create the absurd result
that once a novel and non-obvious method of applying a therapy was
found, then all known correlations to all known diseases could also be
claimed. However once that new method became prior art, then no
further correlation could be claimed until the next patentable
improvement in applying such natural correlations. The Mayo-Flook
doctrine readjusts the patentability of diagnostic processes away from
discoveries of new natural correlations as applied by conventional
means toward discoveries of new patentable applicationsof any natural
correlation, be it old or new.
C. Proposalfor the Post-Mayo andPost-Bilski Articulation of a Legal
Testfor the Abstract-IdeaException
For every process patent claim, patent examiners must consider if
there is an identifiable law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract
idea. If a patent claim contains a law of nature, natural correlation,
physical phenomenon, or abstract idea (such as a mathematical
formula), then the judiciary or examining corps should set aside the
382. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, --- F.3d --- (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2011), cert. granted,
vacated, remanded, 130 S. Ct. 3543, Mar. 26 2012.
383. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 8 (2012).
384. See Brief for Myriad Genetics, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 2011
WL 5373694, at *28-35, Mayo, 556 U.S. --- (2012).
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excluded subject matter from the claim.38 5 Then, the claim should be
analyzed for the presence of any non-conventional features that rise to
the level of an inventive concept. To do this, two more steps are
required. First, each step can be analyzed independently and extrasolution steps can be dissected out. Second, all the steps and the
excluded subject matter should be analyzed for the creation of any
synergy that amounts to the level of an inventive concept in the claimed
process as a whole. If there is no inventive concept, the patent claim
should be rejected, invalidated, or cancelled.38 6 Finally, surviving this
test is not conclusive of patent-eligibility.
In addition, the Benson preemption analysis should be applied with
the excluded subject matter included as part of the process. The MorT
Test is an optional analysis that can be used as a proxy for the
preemption principle. Thus, passing either the Mayo standard or the
MorT Test does not mean a claim is patent-eligible because either one
can be used to reject or invalidate a claim despite the outcome of the
other. In other words, the MorT Test remains an important and useful
clue after Mayo v. Prometheus.
The judiciary needs to more carefully observe the precedent set by
Bilski. In Prometheus and AMP v. USPTO, the Federal Circuit blatantly
relied on the MorT Test. In Classen, the Federal Circuit made an effort
to avoid relying on the MorT Test by discussing the mental steps
doctrine and the policies underlying Bilski." Despite this improvement,
the MorT Test should not appear outcome determinative. Instead, the
post-Bilski MorT Test should be applied as a factor-based legal test that
considers the degree or significance of any claim limitations to
machines and transformations in the claimed process as a whole:
1. Physical subject-matter prong: 1) the degree to which another
class of statutory subject matter can be specifically identified in
the claim, and 2) the significance of all claim limitations to such
subject matter in the execution of the claimed process.
2. Transformation prong: 1) the degree to which a
transformation can be specifically identified in the claim that
transforms physical matter or energy, and 2) the degree to which
any such transformation is central to the purpose of the claim.
*
385.

Caveats: steps that are merely extra-solution activity are
Mayo, 556 U.S. at 8.

386. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court was vague as to what features are sufficient to
qualify as an inventive concept. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
387. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1065-67 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
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excluded from the analysis, and the entire analysis is obviated if
the claim so manifestly fails the Benson preemption test.38 8
Although this new formulation of the MorT Test might not seem
completely satisfying, at least it gives the examining corps and the
judiciary language to use in order to project the impression of not
relying on the traditional MorT Test, regardless of what underlies their
actual decision.
D. Criticism of the Approach in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court altered significantly that
analysis of the non-statutory exceptions to section 101 to account for
deficiencies in the statutory language of sections 102 and 103. In Mayo,
the Supreme Court noted that "to shift the patent-eligibility inquiry
entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that they
are not equipped to do." 389 Unfortunately, the Court might have created
even greater legal uncertainty than it tried to avoid because the Court's
opinion can be read to apply to any judicial exception, not just to those
involving "laws of. nature."390 This new approach has far-reaching
consequences for the patenting of various methods unrelated to
medicine. 391
Anytime a subject is excluded from patentability, a generic cry can
be voiced that the result will be: 1) the destruction of incentives to
innovate regarding the excluded subject, 2) the suppression of
knowledge as innovators are forced to rely on trade secrets, and 3) a
shift from invention of self-disclosing inventions in favor of non-selfdisclosing inventions that can be protected as trade secrets. 39 2 As for the
388. See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims
in view of Bilski v. Kappos, July 27, 2010 at 43924-26, available at http://www.uspto.gov/
patents/law/exam/bilskiguidance_27jul201 0.pdf.
389. Mayo, 556 U.S. --- (2012).
390. Id. at *3 ("simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality, to laws of nature, nature phenomena, and abstract idea cannot make those laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable.").
391. For example, the Mayo-Flook approach may prevent the patenting of business
methods for which the only limitation satisfying the MorT Test is a conventional application of
a computer for performing calculations; however, this might have already been the state of the
law. SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1333 ("In order for the addition of a machine to impose a
meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part on permitting the
claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism").
392. The patent system provides two primary benefits: incentives and disclosure. See Alan
Devlin, The MisunderstoodFunction of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 401,
410-11 (2010).
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first, there already exist strong traditional incentives to medical
researchers to find the natural correlations for diagnostic purposes
outside of commercialization, often funded by the taxpayer. 393 As to the
second and third, suppression of natural correlations will presumably
increase; however, the incentives mentioned in attenuating the first
argument likely will lead to independent discovery of suppressed
natural correlations, probably within much less than a twenty-year
patent term, and, thus, the most sought after natural correlations will not
remain suppressed for long.39 4
Although the reasoning in Mayo appeared based on the precedent set
in Flook, many believed that this component of Flook had been
overruled sub silentio by Diehr.3 95 Justice Stewart's dissent in Flook is
just as relevant today as in 1978 when he wrote:
[The Court strikes what seems to be a] damaging blow at basic
principles of patent law by importing into its inquiry under 35
U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness. Section
101 is concerned only with subject-matter patentability. Whether
a patent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of §§ 102
and 103, which include novelty and inventiveness, among many
others.3 96
This far-reaching decision might make section 101 challenges the
"next toss-in" for every defendant's response to patent infringement suit
involving any patented process and "swamp" the lower courts with
section 101 jurisprudence.3 9 7 This judicial behavior by the Supreme
393. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms ofScience, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77,88 (1999).
394. The probability of independent discovery of a natural correlation between a disease
and a biomarker generally is proportionately related to the strength of the correlation, putting
aside differences in investments and interest levels in the certain diseases and markers.
395. Allen B. Wagner, Patenting Computer Science: Are Computer Instruction Writings
Patentable?, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 277, 302 (1998); Lance L. Vietzke,
Student Author, Software PatentProtection: A Problem-Solution Theory for Harmonizing the
Precedent, 12 COMPUTER L.J. 25, 35-38 (1993); see Arrhythmia Research, 958 F.3d at 1057 n.4
(Diehr"inpart superceded" Flook).
396. Flook, 437 U.S. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Stevens's
dissent in Diehr seemed to agree. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 213 ("In the § 101 analysis, [the Court]
must assume that the sequence of steps in [the claimed] method is novel, unobvious, and
useful."). Did Mayo overrule sub silentio Diehr's sub silentio overrule of Flook? See Mayo, 556
U.S. at 10. Would the unanimous Mayo Court have found Diehr's patent claims invalid, as was
the opinion of the dissenting Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, who voted
with the majority in Flook?
397. MySpace, 2012 WL 716435, at *6-8 (Judge Plager explained this view with support
of Judge Newman and with reference to Chief Judge Rader's support of this approach); Brief of
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in Support of Respondent, 2011 WL 5373692, at *18-22,
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Court breeds uncertainty because the judicial exceptions to section 101
are not statutory and thus extremely malleable. 3 " In addition to the
judicial exceptions to section 101 being subject to unpredictable
changes over time, individual applications of section 101 by the lower
courts might already have become too subjective in application to
provide any semblance of certainty. 399
A better solution might be for Congress to either codify the judicial
exceptions to patent-eligibility into statutory form within section 101 or
to amend sections 102 and 103 to allow the parsing out of claims any
identifiable laws of nature, natural correlations or abstract ideas during
102 or 103 analyses. Many people, such as the Solicitor General of the
United States and some Federal Circuit judges, have argued in favor of
using sections 102 and 103 to screen-out Prometheus-type claims
because these later sections are better understood and more
developed.4 0 0 In addition, sections 102, 103, and 112 may already be
capable of performing the exclusion of claims that violate the Mayo
doctrine, that is, claims that only combine patent-ineligible subjects
with features that are already known, conventional, obvious, wellunderstood, routine, and or previously engaged in, by those in the art.
CONCLUSION

The boundaries between the abstract-idea or law-of-nature
exceptions and the application of an abstract idea or law of nature are
far from clear. This might be explained in light of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to categorically exclude from eligibility entire subject
matters, such as business methods, organisms and software. 40 ' The
Court is pressured to avoid strict bright line borders to avoid a de facto
exclusion of a class of subject matter without the intent of Congress. For
example, the Court's most recent decision regarding subject-matter
eligibility, Mayo and Bilski, failed to provide a clear legal standard for
determining when a patent claim has crossed the line into an abstract
Mayo, 556 U.S. --- (2012); Brieffor the U.S. as Amicus Curiae SupportingNeither Party, 20111
WL 4040414, at *26-32.
398. See id.
399. Brief of Microsoft Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 2011 WL
4040399, at *8-* 16.
400. MySpace, 2012 WL 716435, at *6-8 (Judge Plager explained this view with support
of Judge Newman and with reference to Chief Judge Rader's support of this approach); Brief of
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in Support of Respondent, 2011 WL 5373692, at *18-22;
Mayo, 556 U.S. --- (2012); Brieffor the US. as Amicus CuriaeSupporting Neither Party, 2011
WL 4040414, at *26-32..
401. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
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idea or law-of-nature exception.
Meanwhile, the Federal Circuit, which must routinely apply these
standards, has tried developing more rule-like legal tests such as the
Machine-or-Transform Test (MorT).4 0 2 Recent cases like Classen, AMP
v. USPTO, and Prometheus show the Federal Circuit's MorT Test in
action after Bilski. In AMP v. USPTO, the Federal Circuit held that
several claimed processes are abstract, mental steps and failed MorT. 403
This opinion, like the one in Prometheus, suggest that the Federal
Circuit views the MorT Test as outcome determinative in this situation
despite the Supreme Court's warnings in Bilski and Metabolite. "We
therefore understand the Supreme Court to have rejected the exclusive
nature of our test, but not necessarily the wisdom behind it."A04
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit seems to prefer finding the MorT Test
outcome determinative for analyzing processes directed to medical
diagnostics but not for processes directed to pure computer software
systems.40 5
In Classen, the Federal Circuit suggested that the processes held as
ineligible subject matter would be patent-eli ible if a transformative,
However, the Federal
immunization step was present in the claim.
Circuit did not answer the question of whether Myriad's claimed
diagnostic processes might be patent-eligible subject matter if the
claims were drafted to include a claim limitation reciting some physical
step; for example, determining the DNA sequence of interest by
extracting or sequencing, or by a functional claim invoking section 112,
6.407 This concern of form versus substance was the exact issued
402. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront ofPatentability,51 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 609, 610-15 (2009).
403. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
404. King Pharms., Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see
Ultramercial,2010 WL 3360098, at *3 ("even after the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski, the
machine or transformation test appears to have a major screening function-albeit not perfect-that
separates unpatentable ideas from patentable ones.").
405. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at **3, 8 (holding patent-ineligible processes for
verifying the validity of credit card transactions over the Internet) ("In holding that the machineor-transformation test "is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
process." Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, the Supreme Court has made clear that a patent claim's
failure to satisfy the machine-or-transformation test is not dispositive of the § 101 inquire.").
406. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066-68 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
407. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d
1329, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Myriad attempts to read into its method claims additional,
transformative steps. As described above, Myriad reads into its claims the steps of (1) extracting
DNA from a human sample, and (2) sequencing the BRCA DNA molecule, arguing that both
steps necessarily precede the step of comparing nucleotide sequences. The claims themselves,
however, do not include either of these steps.").
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voiced in Classen. In applying the exceptions to section 101, the
judiciary might be wary of "exalting form over substance" by
differentiating when the very nature of the claimed subject matter is
patent-ineligible from when the objection lies merely in the words
chosen to claim it.4 08 The Supreme Court repeated this concern in Mayo
v. Prometheus: patent eligibility should not "depend simply on the
draftsman's art without reference to the principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for natural laws."
While the Mayo decision overturned the Federal Circuit's holding in
Prometheus, the Supreme Court was silent as to the Federal Circuit's
usage of the MorT Test and instead resurrected an approach from Flook
for invalidating patent claims under section 101.410 Just as the Galactic
Empire struck back in Star Wars but eventually lost the war to the Rebel
Alliance, the Federal Circuit's reassertion of the MorT Test was
defeated by the Supreme Court. However going forward, the Federal
Circuit will get its chance to shape the Mayo doctrine. 4 1 1

408. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1073-75 (Rader & Newman, J.J., additional views); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
409. Mayo, 556 U.S. at 3.
410. Many thought this Flook approach was overruled sub silentio by Diehr. See supra
text accompanying note 393; but see supra text accompanying note 276.
411. Lower courts often redefine precedents. "[W]e agree that, if [a Supreme Court
precedent] meant to lay down a general doctrine, it would cover this case; at least, the language
of the majority opinion goes so far. We do not believe that it did. While it is of course true that
law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases where the occasion is at once the
justification for, and the limit of, what is decided." Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d
279 (2d Cir. 1929) (emphasis added); see also Timothy Schwarz, Cases Time Forgot: Why
Judges Can Sometimes Ignore ControllingPrecedent,56 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2007).
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